









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Brouwers, S. A. (2008). Culture and cognitive transfer in childhood. Ridderprint.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Culture and Cognitive Transfer in Childhood 
 
 
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, op 
gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. F. A. van der Duyn Schouten, in het openbaar te 
verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie 
in de Marga Klompé zaal op donderdag 25 september 2008 om 16:15 uur door Sijmen 




Promotor:  prof. dr. A. J. R. van de Vijver 
 
Commissie: prof. dr. A. Demetriou 
prof. dr. Y. H. Poortinga 
prof. dr. W. C. M. Resing 
dr. A. Chasiotis 

















Gedrukt door Ridder Print, Ridderkerk 
 
 
Brouwers, Symen A. 
Culture and Cognitive Transfer in Childhood 
ISBN/EAN: 978-90-5335-167-3 
 
Cover photo: © TIM WALKER PICTURES, published by teNeues, €98, www.teneus.com 




Individual human beings are converse about the suitability of ideas, expressions, assertions 
and methods because they recognize the differences and similarities of different situations 
and contexts. In my case, I could write this dissertation only because a number of friends 
and colleagues have ventured to make me experience a variety of everyday situations and a 
variety of relevant affairs in cross-cultural psychology.  
First and foremost I am grateful to Fons. Our conversations inspired me to sort out 
questions and methods in the study of culture and cognition and to curb my enthusiasm to 
branch out wildly. The pleasure I find in academic research stems from Fons’ enterprising 
and resourceful nature. For me, particular novels, landscapes, and musical themes have 
specific associations. I will always associate Fons with the music of Bach, in which true 
interest and emotion arise from rigorous methodology, but also because I will never forget 
him humming a few of Bach’s themes during some of our meetings. 
Two other men that have been really important to my development are Ramesh and 
Ype. My time in Varanasi was made comfortable by Ramesh and his family. It makes me 
proud to hear Ramesh say I am now part of his family. My fieldwork has greatly benefited 
from Ramesh’ expertise. Ype has made the process of giving feedback and critique into an 
art and not only the content and style of this dissertation have benefited greatly from his 
input, but also my basic approach to writing and research has been shaped by him. Having 
around another Frysian was a great comfort. 
A significant part of my activities from April 2003 until July 2007 have consisted of 
assisting Fons during his tenure as Editor of the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. I 
would like to thank Walt for teaming up with me and his kind interest. I also would like to 
thank David, Debbie, Junko, Karen, Tim and Ute. The memory that on several afternoons I 
exchanged e-mail with Walt, early morning in the USA, and Junko, early the next night in 
Japan, within a span of thirty minute cranks me up. 
Several people have been instrumental in completing studies in this dissertation. My 
fieldwork in India would not been completed without the help of Rajesh, Manoj, Mukesh, 
S.P.Singh, Ramlal, Punnu and Lalsaheb. Their dedication and good humor was a pleasure. 
Some of the most memorable experiences I ever had was in their company. The apparatus 
and software used for data collection in The Netherlands were developed by Ton and Charl 
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The ability to cognitively transfer information from one situation to another is an important 
element of everyday human intelligence and it has been widely studied (see Barnett & 
Ceci, 2002 for an extensive review). Nevertheless, some important questions remain. One 
of these questions concerns the notion of context. Previous research has shown that success 
of transfer significantly depends on crossing the temporal, physical, or functional 
boundaries that separate many contexts from each other. What remains unclear is how 
specific contexts really are: People are able to transfer knowledge from one context to 
another on occasion, not on all occasions, but sometimes. On part of the actor, this requires 
some sort of understanding of why information is linked to specific situations or, 
alternatively, why it can be transferred to other situations. The present dissertation reports 
on four studies that investigate how children understand information. The first study starts 
rather distal to psychological process; it examines country and historical differences in 
Raven’s Matrices scores. The three subsequent studies adopt a more proximal perspective, 
zooming in on the processes and causes that produce or moderate cognitive transfer. The 
four studies in my dissertation investigate variations on four of six scales of Cole’s (1996) 
model about the distribution of cognition in time: the history of human beings on earth, the 
history of the individual’s immediate context, the life of the individual himself, and finally 
the history of moment-to-moment lived experience. Geological time and phylogeny (the 
first two scales mentioned by Cole) are ignored for now. 
The point of entry in the next four studies are the relations between culture and 
cognition. In this introduction I review the most common perspectives on the cross-cultural 
specificity of human cognition. Perspectives typically consist of conflicting ideas about the 
role of cognitive domains in cross-cultural differences and either claim that domains have 
different function in different cultures or that domains can only be accessed with specific 
stimuli. After my review of these two main perspectives, I present an alternative: dynamic 
representation. I conclude this introduction with an outline of the specific themes of each 




of the four studies that make up the body of this dissertation. 
 
Access and representation 
The specificity of any form of behavior or information processing to particular 
contexts suggests that contexts access the mental representation of individual actors. The 
psychological significance of access stems from research of both classical and operant 
conditioning. A stimulus, usually outside the actor, triggers a response in the actor, when 
this stimulus has previously been conditioned on the response (Skinner, 1950). A closer 
examination of the term access in the Oxford English Dictionary and the Van Dale Groot 
Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal (for “toegang”) reveals three different definitions: (i) 
coming to or towards, approaching; (ii) a way or means of approach; and (iii) the license to 
approach. This more detailed definition of access suggests larger involvement on part of 
the actor. Psychologically, access is also perceived as being broader than recognized in 
strict S-R models. Research has shown that people have access to a broad repertoire of 
mentally represented information and that their success benefits from such information 
(Bandura, 1977). 
Mental representation is one type in a broader family of representations, which also 
includes painting, poetry and prose. All types of representations share important properties. 
So are all representations realized through a representation bearer, which is a canvas for 
painting, a book for poetry, and the human mind for mental representation. Nevertheless, 
defining mental representation is not a simple task and depends on which metaphor is used 
to portray the human mind, which is either a rule based system or an associative network, 
and whether all parts of a representation are accessed at once or whether discrete pieces of 
information are only accessed one at a time (Von Eckardt, 1999). Typically, it is thought 
that all parts of a representation are accessed at once (Piaget, 1947/2001; Vygotsky, 1978). 
The idea that historical and contextual meaning is psychologically intrinsic to isolated 
constituents of everyday life, such as artifacts, behaviors, and thoughts, still dominates 
psychology. Apparently, they come with a ‘manual’ that says how, where and when they 
can be used; at least, that is what researchers seem to think. Nevertheless, support of the 





constituents of everyday life has waned during the twentieth century. According to James 
(1909), context is pluralistic, not uni-verse, but multi-verse. Context thus consists of many 
distinctive parts, such as home, neighborhood, customs, and task demands, that each has its 
own specific demands. Following James’ analysis, the remainder of this dissertation works 
from the position that mental representation really is an associative network of discrete 
pieces of information that are accessed individually. 
 
Culture and cognitive transfer 
Research on cognitive transfer has had a long history. The main finding from this 
research is that children and adults have significant problems with transferring procedures, 
representations, or principles from one problem or situation to another (Barnett & Ceci, 
2002; diSessa, 1993; Wagner, 2006). In fact, several now classic studies demonstrated that 
children’s far transfer did not increase after prolonged training and that training effects are 
limited to tasks that are similar to the task that was trained (Cole & Bruner, 1971; Cole, 
Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971; Cole & Scribner, 1974; Scribner & Cole, 1981). Research on 
transfer and nontransfer showed that transfer occurs by a mixture of automatic triggering 
and intentional mindful abstraction, but transfer is impeded when available information is 
inert and not sufficiently strong to establish associations between one context and the other 
(e.g., Salomon & Perkins, 1989). Recognition of the possible inertia of information has in 
recent decades led to a broader study of domain-specificity. Research on the link between 
culture and cognition has centered on the issue of whether domains themselves are culture 
specific (Nisbett, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000), or whether domains are 
universally available (Sternberg et al., 2002). Developmental research has shown that from 
a very young age children recognize goal-directed behavior (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), living kinds (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996, 2002) and 
human-made artifacts (Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & 
Blair, 2000). These findings suggest that certain domains are universally available, but do 
not account for differences in transfer and how these connect to domains. 
One way to solve the combination of stable domains and differences in transfer has 
been to broaden the definition of transfer and to explicitly include a predictive phase in 




addition to an inference phase. Transfer from one object property to another involves the 
inference of one attribute (a psychological property that is general across different 
situations) from this property and the subsequent application of this attribute to some other 
property (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). Schematically, this resembles the following course: 
property → attribute → property (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). Lack of transfer is 
typically attributed to difficulties in the inference of appropriate attributes and research has 
led to two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that schooling and culture shape 
children’s internal cognitive structures; the second hypothesis states that schooling and 
culture only facilitate the ease by which children are able to access universal cognitive 
structures (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). These two 
hypotheses are discussed in more detail. This discussion is directly followed by an 
alternative hypothesis that aims to combine the strengths of both established hypotheses, 
but address their weaknesses. 
 
Socialization of usage 
Children from different cultures might show different patterns of transfer because 
the same stimuli give children from different cultures access to different internal cognitive 
structures. These variations in internal structure arise by way of culture-specific practices 
through which they were socialized by their parents or teachers (e.g., Olson, 1994). 
Socialization facilitates the abstraction of a qualitatively higher level of representation in 
children. At higher levels of abstraction children are more likely to recognize that relevant 
procedures, representations, or principles may be transferred from one task to the other and 
that these procedures, representations, or principles may be mentally manipulated in a 
detached fashion (Lave, 1988). Schooled children can more easily than unschooled 
children transfer their existing understanding to novel tasks and materials, using higher 
levels of abstraction, which enables them to attain a higher rate of cognitive development. 
Much research has been invested to explore the effect of socialization on transfer (Cole & 
Bruner, 1971; Rogoff, 1981; Serpell, 1993).  
The most important factor for explaining the cognitive consequences of 





such as intonation, that are absent in written texts. When children learn to read they 
necessarily have to attain a new way of looking at things, a way in which the information 
available in the text is taken as independent and sufficient for understanding the nature of 
what is presented (Olson, 1994). Literacy thus stimulates children to attain a more abstract 
perspective. Scribner and Cole (1981) and Berry and Bennett (1991) studied the impact of 
literacy on cognitive functioning. In a study among the Vai in Liberia, Scribner and Cole 
(1981) could avoid the confounding of schooling and literacy, because the Vai have three 
distinct literacy practices with each having its distinct course of instruction. Literacy 
showed a much more restricted transfer of skills to other domains of intellectual 
performance than did schooling. Berry and Bennett (1991) replicated the findings of 
Scribner and Cole among the Cree in Canada. Both studies suggest that literacy does not 
explain all performance differences between schooled and unschooled children and that 
literacy is not a vehicle for attaining a qualitatively higher level of abstraction. 
Literacy is not the only way to socialize children. Out-of-context instruction is 
another relevant way to influence children’s way of thinking. Instruction in everyday life is 
often restricted to a particular situation with an immediate and clear purpose and is less 
geared toward transfer. Schooling provides children with cognitive challenges not often 
found in the everyday context and directly taps into the skill of transfer (Bruner, 1966). 
Yet, despite greater familiarity with decontextualized spatial tasks, children raised in the 
U.S.A. performed poorer than Mayan children on culturally embedded spatial tasks, 
familiar to Mayan children as they were derived from the domain of weaving that is 
common to these children (Maynard & Greenfield, 2003). However, the mass practice in 
weaving did not produce a high context-independent skill in spatial representation despite 
substantial skill in pattern weaving among Mayan children (Greenfield & Childs, 1977). 
Similarly, Lave presented Liberian schooled adults and unschooled tailors with arithmetic 
problems in both school and tailoring forms of the same nature and complexity (Lave, 
1980/1997). While schooling better predicted arithmetic performance on school problems, 
tailoring experience better predicted arithmetic performance on tailoring problems. These 
findings contradict the basic assumption that cognitive transfer is a context-independent 
skill.  




Specificity of access 
Another reason why children from different cultures are likely to infer different 
attributes from similar properties is that children need to be familiar with highly specific 
prompts in order to gain access to the procedures, representations, or principles they all 
know in the same way. Lack of familiarity with those prompts prevents transfer (e.g., 
Sternberg et al., 2002). Basic cognitive functioning is thought to be similar for all children 
across all cultures, but they ways in which it is manifested may vary across cultures. The 
performance on cognitive tests varies with their ecological validity (Berry, Poortinga, 
Segall, & Dasen, 2002; Cole, 1996; Ferguson, 1956; Schliemann, Carrahar, & Ceci, 1997; 
Van de Vijver, 2002). Problems in the inference of attributes thus should be highly specific 
to distinct content domains. The most basic type of specificity is task-specificity, but 
specificity can also be broader, so as to include fields of knowledge that consist of factual 
information, specific strategies, and the knowledge when or how to use these strategies (cf. 
Alexander & Judy, 1988). 
Psychometric and neo-Piagetian (Case, 1985; also see Piaget, 1947/2001) studies of 
intelligence found that components of cognitive functioning are captured in an overarching 
structure of cognitive abilities (Carroll, 1993) and that this structure is equivalent across 
cultures. Advocates of task-specific mechanisms propose that transfer of skill is moderated 
by the format in which the tasks designed to observe and describe this skill are presented 
and the extent to which children have been exposed to this task format (Berry et al., 2002; 
Cole & Bruner, 1971; Dasen & Heron, 1981; Mishra, 1997; Schliemann et al., 1997; Super 
& Harkness, 1986). Schooling (Rogoff, 1981) and westernization (Mishra, Sinha, & Berry, 
1996) make children more familiar with testing, and this familiarity increases their 
performance on intelligence tests (Helms-Lorenz, Van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2003; Van 
de Vijver, 1997). Environmental limitations such as poor schooling, child labor, 
malnutrition, and pandemics may limit exposure (Fagan & Holland, 2002; Feuerstein, 
1979; Sternberg et al., 2002). As a consequence there may be a gap between potential and 
actual performance.  
In order to bridge this gap among rural Tanzanian school children, Sternberg et al. 





enhancing skills and strategies contributing to success on the administered cognitive tests. 
Children that underwent familiarization increased their performance from pretest to 
posttest significantly more than a control group did; pretest-posttest correlations were 
weak; posttest scores were better predictors of reference measures of mental ability. A 
meta-analytic comparison of (i) models that see cross-cultural differences as valid 
intergroup differences in underlying competence and (ii) models that see cross-cultural 
score differences as a consequence of inadequacies of the measurement instruments found 
substantial support for the latter (Van de Vijver, 1997). 
Cognitive anthropological studies of cognitive ability tend to ignore larger 
underlying structures and instead argue that competence is more domain specific (Billet, 
1996). This research usually adopts a neo-Vygotskian perspective, which conceives of 
cognitive development as a process of internalization (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978). Sociocultural 
and communicative interactions in which adults and children participate shape the mental 
representations that they acquire about particular operations (Cole, 1996; Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Rogoff, 1990; Shore, 1996). In distinct sociocultural contexts different 
representations of the same or totally other skills may emerge. For example, Lave (1988) 
discusses the shopping activities of some shoppers in a supermarket in the U.S.A., 
observing that these shoppers have a highly specific system of arithmetic processes for 
calculating prices and deciding between products in just this particular sociocultural 
context. One strategy which shoppers use is the gap-closing arithmetic. They decide about 
the feasibility of a probable resolution by comparing this resolution with the expected 
solution and adjusting the calculations when necessary. Gigerenzer, Todd, and The ABC 
Research Group (1999) also noted the highly specific use of heuristics for decision making 
in specific environments. Although developed in a different school, the work on modules 
and modularity of cognitive functioning also combines the universality of basic cognitive 
functions with domain-specific skills (Cole, 1996; Fodor, 1983; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). Cross-cultural differences may emerge as the result of different sets of modules 
being developed in each culture. Although the approach seems promising, applications 
show two problems. First, the number of possible modules is inexhaustible. Second, 
research on modularity so far has focused on the universality of modules rather than on 




their cultural specificity. 
Having reviewed research on the socialization of function and the specificity of 
access, it is clear that the process of inferring attributes from object properties has been 
well documented in the psychology literature and that there is empirical evidence in favor 
of both. At the same time, evidence of neither gives a full account of the origin of cross-
cultural differences and the two hypotheses might be treated as complementary. Clearly, 
researchers still struggle with the problem of how to conceptualize the influence of 
schooling and culture, both separately and jointly, in cognitive functioning (Berry et al., 
2002; Shore, 1996). As already discussed above, the process of inferring attributes from 
properties is not the only phase in property to property transfer. A second phase consists of 
the prediction and extraction of new properties from the inferred attribute. The richness of 
people’s mental representation is a good facilitator of this predictive phase (Elman, Bates, 
Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, & Plunkett, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Marcus, 
1998, 2001). This line of thinking is discussed in the next section. 
 
Dynamic representation 
Everyday life creates an amazing variety of cognitive tasks. Even by looking at 
something as simple as an evening meal it is easy to be overwhelmed by the dynamics 
involved (de Certeau, Giard, & Mayol, 1998). For one thing, the meal has to be prepared. 
Thus, there are the ingredients, the recipes and the time spent behind the stove. It is good 
to know how many people are going to join, since the table has to be made ready and 
utensils have to be put out. People should be sitting at the dining table in time, so that the 
food does not get cold. And then there are still other issues as well, such as the etiquette. 
Examples include, rules about who is allowed to speak during the meal and who is not, and 
rules for showing the meal was satisfying. Anyone of these aspects of a meal may give rise 
to a range of shifting dynamics. What if one parent is absent during the meal or if there are 
guests? What if one has dietary preferences? What if a particular layout of utensils is 
necessary for what will be served? What if this meal is in India or in Turkey and not in 
Sweden or in Italy? Recognizing all these details, all the cognitive, affective and social 





actually carry out successfully. Of course, as we all know of others and of ourselves, 
people accomplish these tasks with remarkable ease.  
There is growing appeal for the character of dynamic cognition. Many studies have 
examined dynamic representation empirically (e.g., Amsterlaw, 2006; Diesendruck, 2001; 
Diesendruck & Halevi, 2006; Gelman, 2003; Lutz & Keil, 2002). And many other studies 
have investigated issues that relate to the dynamic nature of cognition (e.g., Bailenson, 
Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002; Barsalou, 1985; Benet-Martinez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; 
Grigorenko et al, 2001; Schwanenflugel, Henderson, & Fabricius, 1998). Variation in 
dynamic representation may be between-individuals and within individuals.  
The classic constructionist theory of cognitive development does not separate 
between-individual variation from within-individual variation. Cognitive development is 
conceptualized as children’s gradual construction of culturally shared representations 
through the continuing internalization of novel but discrete units of information (Piaget, 
1947/2001). Through this construction, representations gradually approach some abstract 
version of reality. A well-known illustration is that of conservation of fluid: Water is 
poured from one glass into another glass with a different height and width. Children need 
to tell whether the level of water will be higher or lower. Young children typically attend 
to one dimension, often height. As they grow older, they start to recognize the other 
dimension, but in their predictions they only attend to the two dimensions inconsistently. 
Later they will attend to both dimensions simultaneously and consistently. This 
consistency may be true for concepts such as conservation, but in many everyday 
transactions the required operations are usually less fixed, as illustrated by the example of 
the shared meal. The classic developmental approach does not provide a framework for 
such within-individual variation, where shifting constellations of operations and features 
should be recognized and dealt with.  
A more contemporary conceptualization seems to deal more easily with dynamic 
variation in cognition or cognitive development. Instead of building constructs from only a 
few elements children are thought to develop by means of representational redescription 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; also see Dienes & Perner, 1999; Pine & Messer, 2000; Reber, 
1989). Representational redescription involves the distinction of implicit and explicit 




levels of representation. 
Implicit representation reflects the intuitive understanding that a disparate 
collection of different elements can relate to one another in concrete ways (Ahn, Gelman, 
Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 2000; Pine & Messer, 2000). Young children 
understand that integers are distinct marks on a scale (Le Corre, Van de Walle, Brannon, & 
Carey, 2006). Thus, looking at three dolls and seven toy balls, young children immediately 
recognize that there are more toy balls than dolls, even when they cannot justify this in 
explicit numbers. In contrast, explicit representation reflects conventions or rules that are 
extrinsic to the representation about how discrete units of information are assembled 
(Barsalou, 1985; Langacker, 1986). Thus, cooking a meal is led by considerations about 
food preferences, the costs of the ingredients, and the time it takes to prepare these. While 
all these elements taken together might lead to an implicit understanding of the purpose of 
the cook (i.e., to feed people) only an explicit understanding of the concrete actions will 
lead to the actual meal. Only after redescription of the implicit representation into an 
explicit representation, through the increasing familiarity with relevant features, children 
may be able to access and actively employ their representation voluntarily. It is in the 
explicit representation that dynamics can be realized. 
 
This dissertation 
My dissertation addresses the complex link between culture and cognition and the 
question whether success and failure of cognitive transfer should be attributed to children’s 
mental representation. I start with examining quite distal relationships by investigating the 
differences between countries and differences across historical time in Raven Matrices 
scores. Gradually a more proximal perspective is adopted, zooming in on the processes and 
causes that produce or moderate cognitive transfer in childhood. The studies in this 
dissertation examine dynamic variation at four of six times scales of Cole’s (1996) model 
of the distribution of cognition in time. The model includes six time scales that frame 
children’s experience: the history of the physical universe (geological time), the history of 
life on earth (phylogeny), the history of human beings on earth (cultural-historical time), 





individual himself (ontogeny), and finally the history of moment-to-moment lived 
experience (microgenesis). Geological time and phylogeny are ignored for now. 
The first study addresses cultural-historical time in a broad meta-analysis of cultural 
and historical variation in performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Cross-cultural 
comparisons with the Raven tests are often conducted from the premise that the instrument 
measures cross-cultural differences in intelligence that are not confounded by other 
cultural or national differences, such as education and affluence (Raven, 2000; Rushton, 
Skuy, & Bons, 2004). However, the rise of performance across generations, which is 
commonly known as the Flynn effect, is now a well-established effect (Flynn, 2007). We 
examine how the Flynn effect is affected by culture-level variables such as affluence.  
The second study addresses ontogeny of the ‘outside’ in a cross-sectional 
comparison of schooling and everyday experiences and their separate contribution to 
children’s cognitive development amongst Kharwar children in rural India. The 
comparison of the separate effects of educational age and chronological age is a better 
approach for unraveling the cognitive consequences of schooling and everyday 
experiences, but such a comparison is difficult to implement in practice. Western-based 
studies would only employ highly correlated measures of chronological and educational 
age (all children go to school), while Non-Western studies tend to confound educational 
age with socioeconomic status (mainly children of affluent families go to school). In the 
present study we take advantage of a specific setting in India, in which neither educational 
and chronological age, nor schooling and status are confounded, allowing a study design 
that avoids the usual limitations of schooling effect studies. 
The third study is a longitudinal extension of the second study and addresses 
ontogeny of the child more directly than was done in the (cross-sectional) second study, by 
looking at variations in impact of the different processes of cognitive development. 
Originally it was argued that cognitive change over time is linear (Schaie, 1965). This 
position would suggest that the ratio of the effects of chronological age and educational 
age remains constant and that there is no shift in emphasis from the former to the latter 
with more advanced development. In contrast, recent evidence suggests that developmental 
trajectories do change shape, through dynamic interaction (Fischer & Paré-Blagoev, 2000). 




A longitudinal comparison in which chronological and educational age are disentangled 
from each other is employed to address this issue. 
The fourth study is a microgenetic examination of the way by which children may 
shift from one kind of information to another in order to infer category membership of 
everyday items (i.e, typicality), among Dutch monocultural and bicultural children. 
Children may take cues from clearly discernable features, such as physical appearance or 
statistical properties, but they may also bring a priori goals to the task. Studies of typicality 
tend to aim exclusively at showing that typicality is a guiding principle in categorization 
(thus affects the outcome of the inference process), but not at examining the conditions 
under which typicality may actually show up in everyday life. We realize a natural 
variation in typicality by selecting stimuli from both Turkish and Dutch cultures and then 
exposing Turkish-Dutch bicultural children as well as Dutch monocultural children to both 
kinds of stimuli in a timed visual search task. 
Together these four studies examine culture and cognitive transfer in childhood. 
Dynamic variation at each of the four relevant scales of cognition in time (variation of the 
Flynn effect across countries with differences in affluence; unique effects of chronological 
and educational age; distinct patterns of change across chronological and educational age; 
and the situatedness of typicality) tests the hypothesis that success and failure of cognitive 
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Variation in Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
Scores across Time and Place 
 
 
The paper describes a cross-cultural and historical meta-analysis of Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices. Data were analyzed of 798 samples from 45 countries (? = 
244,316), which were published between 1944 and 2003. Country-level indicators 
of educational permeation (which involves a broad set of interrelated educational 
input and output factors that are strongly related to economic development), the 
samples’ educational age, and publication year were all independently related to 
performance on Raven’s matrices. Our data suggest that the Flynn effect can be 
found in high as well as low GNP countries, although its size is moderated by 
education-related sample and country characteristics. An equivalent increase in 
education-related input characteristics in developed and emerging countries seems 
to bring about a larger performance increase in emerging countries. 
 
 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices are a series of multiple-choice items of abstract reasoning. 
Each item depicts an abstract pattern in a two by two or three by three matrix; all cells 
contain a figure except for the cell in the right lower corner. Participants are asked to 
identify the missing segment that would best complement the pattern constituted by the 
other cells among a set of alternatives that are positioned beneath the matrix. John C. 
Raven published the first version of the test in 1938; the three versions of the test 
(Advanced, Colored, and Standard Progressive Matrices) have since been among the most 
widely-used intelligence tests. Its intuitively appealing question format and the use of 
figure stimuli have made the test attractive for cross-cultural comparisons. A meta-analysis 




of cross-cultural intelligence test scores found that the test takes a second place after the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children (Van de Vijver, 1997). This widespread usage 
makes the test an interesting instrument for a cross-cultural meta-analysis. Moreover, the 
period in which the Raven has been used in various countries is long enough for enabling a 
study of a temporal patterning of test scores. In the present article, we report a meta-
analysis of Raven performance of children and adults from 45 countries across a time span 
of 60 years. 
Cross-cultural comparisons with the Raven tests are often conducted from the 
premise that the instrument measures cross-cultural differences in intelligence that are not 
confounded by other cultural or national differences, such as education and affluence 
(Raven, 2000; Rushton, Skuy, & Bons, 2004). ‘Culture-free’ (Cattell, 1940), ‘culture-fair’ 
(Cattell & Cattell, 1963), and ‘culture-reduced’ (Jensen, 1980) are all terms that have been 
proposed to describe the Raven or similar tests that do not seem to require much cultural 
knowledge for answering the items correctly. Particularly the first two labels are not 
undisputed. As early as 1966 Frijda and Jahoda argued that it is impossible to measure 
intelligence without the confounding influence of cultural factors, as both the definition of 
the concept and its expression are cultural. Nevertheless, the Raven tests are still 
considered to be measures of intelligence that show less influence of confounding cultural 
factors on the cross-national differences than any other intelligence test. 
On a historical level, some role of country characteristics has now been well 
established. The rise of intelligence test scores over time, which is generally known as the 
Flynn effect (Flynn, 1987), has been ascribed to such factors as improved nutrition 
(Colom, Lluis-Font, & Andrés-Puepo, 2005), increased environmental complexity 
(Schooler, 1998), and socialization practices at home and at school (Williams, 1998). The 
bulk of research into the Flynn effect is based on people from high affluence countries. 
Evidence begins to accumulate that the Flynn effect is not confined to high affluence 
countries or countries that invest strongly in educating its inhabitants. Daley, Whaley, 
Sigman, Espinosa, and Neumann (2003) were the first to show a Flynn effect outside the 
twenty largest industrialized countries. In rural Kenya they found that performance on the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices had undergone a strong increase across the fourteen-year 




interval between the pre- and post-tests. The latter study points to the potential cross-
cultural generalizability of the Flynn effect. A cross-cultural meta-analysis of Raven test 
scores across a long period might help to examine this generalizability and to address the 
role of potentially moderating variables such as educational differences between countries. 
In cross-cultural psychology there has long been an influential line of thought in 
which a distinction is made between intelligence and intelligence test scores (Vernon, 
1979). A similar distinction is made in cross-cultural Piagetian psychology: Competence is 
understood to be quite distinct from performance (Dasen, 1977). The differentiation is 
thought to accommodate the influence of various, potentially biasing factors that may 
create a difference between ‘real’ and ‘observed’ intelligence. Examples of these factors 
may be previous test exposure, cultural appropriateness of an instrument and its 
administration procedures, in addition to confounding sample characteristics. Van de 
Vijver and Leung (1997) coined the term ‘method bias’ to refer to the overall impact 
caused by these confounding factors. There is empirical evidence that such factors 
contribute to Raven performance. For example, Ombrédane, Robaye, and Plumail (1956) 
showed that the predictive validity of Raven performance became stronger by repeated 
administration in a group of illiterate, Congolese mine workers. Retest effects due to 
method factors are not restricted to non-Western participants and also prevail among 
Westerners (e.g., Blieszner, Willis, & Baltes, 1981; Wing, 1980). Te Nijenhuis, Van 
Vianen, and Van der Flier (2007) were able to show in a meta-analysis that gains on 
intelligence test scores after retesting or intervention tend not to be related to general 
intelligence (‘g’). These findings are in line with our notion of method bias. 
From an ontogenetic perspective, educational indicators relate to the frequency with 
which people have opportunities for cognitive stimulation. The Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices are measures of reasoning and in order to reason people need opportunities for 
learning how to transform given information into conclusions (Galotti, 1989). Vygotsky 
(1978) directly related education to the potential gap between competence and 
performance. He reasoned that performance only reflects one’s actual level of development 
and thus only the development that is already completed. Working in rural Tanzania, 
Sternberg and colleagues examined the utility of dynamic testing of school-attending 




children (Sternberg et al., 2002). They familiarized children with the skills and strategies 
that are thought to contribute to success on tests of cognitive ability. A significant gain in 
test scores after training was observed, which was not present in the untrained group 
(which received the same tests the same number of times). The relationship between 
educational indicators and test performance at country level cannot be solely interpreted as 
a simple increase in intellectual functioning through schooling. The influence of test bias 
should also be taken into account; the Raven might contain elements that benefit people 
from one country more than people from another country. 
Educational indicators such as expenditure per capita, educational level of teachers, 
and enrolment rates have been shown to predict country-level scores on cognitive 
instruments (Van de Vijver, 1997). Educational quality indicators are known to belong to a 
cluster of variables that denote economic development (Georgas, Van de Vijver, & Berry, 
2004). Some other variables in this cluster are enrolment into primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education, Gross National Product, percentage of population working in service 
industry, use of mass media, prevalence of telephones, and population growth (the last one 
with a negative relation). 
We present here a meta-analysis of studies that reported data on Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices, comprising samples of children and adults from 45 countries 
covering a period of 60 years. Publication year, educational permeation (a broad set of 
interrelated educational input and output factors at country level), and educational age are 
the three most important variables that are examined in the analysis. Based on the 
literature, we expect the performance on the Raven to increase with educational age 
(operationalized as the average number of years of schooling of the study sample) and 
indicators of educational quality (at country level), and we expect an increase of 




Studies that report data on Raven’s Progressive Matrices were located through 
PsycInfo (1887 to 2003), the Social Sciences Citation Index, the Researcher’s 




Bibliography for Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Mill Hill Vocabulary Scales (Court, 
1995), and the catalogue of Dutch libraries. In addition, a request for data was sent to 200 
authors around the world, plus mailing lists in relevant research areas. Other reports were 
found through snowballing on the basis of reference lists in studies already identified. Data 
that concerned Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), Colored Progressive Matrices 
(CPM), and Advanced Progressive Matrices II (APM II) were included. Sample sizes and 
raw mean or median scores had to be available for all cases. Clinical populations, mentally 
retarded groups, and other samples selected solely on the basis of intellectual capacity 
were not included in the present study. 
The total sample consists of 193 studies; scoring all individual samples separately 
for age and gender resulted in a total number of 798 subsamples; the total sample size was 
244,316. The data set includes data from 45 countries and covers the period from 1944 to 
2003. Table 1 presents the distribution of the 798 subsamples across 45 countries and 60 
years of publication. There is a clear bias in the distributions across country and year of 
publication. The United Kingdom, the United States of America and Poland have seen 
many studies, whereas countries as varied as Venezuela, Syria, Sweden, South Korea, 
Qatar, Norway and Mexico have all seen only one study (and most countries have never 
seen any study). The distribution of studies over time is skewed towards the present, with 
particularly high numbers for the period between 1984 and 1993. The same is true for the 
number of cultures per year. Data from many cultures were reported in the mid-1990s 
studies, but data from very few different cultures were reported until 1981. Of the different 
versions (APM, CPM and SPM) the SPM is by far the most used (62.3% of 798 samples), 
followed by the CPM with 27.3% and the APM with only 10.4%. 
 
Measures 
Study and sample characteristics. Relevant sample and study characteristics were 
taken from the individual publications. The raw mean, standard deviations of every raw 
mean, mean age of the participants, mean number of years of schooling, and gender were 
recorded (if available). The year of publication of the studies was also recorded. 
Country-level characteristics. Relevant country-level characteristics were gathered





Frequencies of Studies per Country and Year of Publication 
Characteristics Number of studies 
Countries  
Congo, France, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, South Korea, 
Sweden, Syria, Venezuela 
1 
 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Germany (East), 
Iceland Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Singapore, Spain,  
 
2 to 10 
 
Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Hong-Kong, Israel, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Romania, Taiwan, Tanzania, Yugoslavia 
 
11 to 19 
 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Germany (West), India, 
Iran, New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa, United 
Kingdom, United States of America 
 
more than 20 
 

















from databases that the United Nations and other institutes provide on their Internet sites. 
Gathered in this way were Gross National Product per capita in 2007 (GNP; Gross 
Domestic Product, 2007), and a number of characteristics related to the education in each 
country, such as illiteracy, rates of enrollment into education, and the number of pupils per 
teacher (Georgas et al., 2004). 
In order to examine the dimensionality of the education-related characteristics at 
country level, illiteracy rate, enrollment into primary, secondary and tertiary education, and 




the number of pupils per teacher were factor analyzed. A first factor with an eigenvalue of 
2.83 was found to explain 56% of the variance. Illiteracy rate had a loading of -.83 on the 
factor, enrollment in primary education one of .09, enrollment into secondary education 
one of .93, enrollment into tertiary education a loading of .76, and the number of pupils per 
teacher a loading of -.83. The low loading of primary enrolment probably reflects the 
limited cross-country variability in this variable because of the universality of compulsory 
primary schooling. The factor covers a broad set of interrelated educational input and 




All scores were transformed from their raw mean to a 0-100 scale, depending on the 
number of items that were administered in the particular samples. Performance on Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices ranged from 10 to 97, with an overall mean of 61.88 and a standard 
deviation of 15.97. Standard deviations were available for 512 of the 798 samples; they 
ranged from 1.00 to 28.84, with a mean of 6.88 and a standard deviation of 3.09. Both 
chronological and educational age showed large ranges. Chronological age ranged from 
3.00 to 82.50 years, with a mean of 16.72 and a standard deviation of 13.94; educational 
age ranged from 0 to 17.17 years, with a mean of 5.84 and a standard deviation of 3.89. 
Sex effects could not be addressed. Nine studies did not report participants’ sex, while 485 
samples had some mixture of both males and females and could not be further broken 
down. Of the 288 remaining samples, 175 samples were entirely composed of males and 
113 of females. 
 
Initial Analyses 
In order to estimate the effect of country on Raven performance, a univariate 
ANOVA was conducted with performance as the dependent variable and country as 
grouping variable. The effect of country on performance is significant, F(44, 753) = 4.79, 
p < .001, partial eta-squared = .22. Cohen (1988) proposed boundary values for small, 
medium, and large effects of .01, .06, and .14, respectively. The effect size observed here


































is thus large. In order to estimate the effect of year of publication on Raven performance, a 
univariate ANOVA with performance as the dependent variable and year of publication as 
the grouping variable was carried out. The effect of year of publication is significant, F(40, 
757) = 3.55, p < .001, and large, partial eta-squared = .16. Figure 1 presents the pattern of 
performance over time. A visual inspection does not suggest a clear patterning despite the 
large effect; mean performance does not look different for the 50s than for the 90s. It looks 
as if there are differences between years that are not part of any long-term trend. 
Figures 2 and 3 visually present the change of performance on Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices across chronological and educational age, respectively. The relationship between






























Figure 2. Performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices plotted against chronological age. 
 
 
chronological age and performance corresponds to that what is typically found in the 
literature (e.g., McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002; Salthouse, 1996). 
There is a sharp increase of performance across childhood, adolescence, and early 
adulthood, which is followed by a gradual decline until old age. The lower scores among 
the older cohorts appear to be common across the three versions, although the APM shows 
the strongest effect (not further documented here). To what extent this finding is due to the 
relative small sample of APM studies will have to remain open. Another source of the 
lower scores seems to be the lower educational age of older cohorts, as explored below in 
more detail. Figure 3 shows the relation between educational age and performance. A 
positive association of test scores and educational age is clearly visible. 






























Figure 3. Performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices plotted against educational age. 
 
 
Correlational and Regression Analyses 
Correlations between relevant sample, study, and country characteristics are 
presented in Table 2. Educational age correlated significantly with year of publication, 
r(514) = -.19, p < .001. The direction of the relation between educational age and year of 
publication is striking. More recent studies apparently sampled participants with on 
average lower educational ages than earlier studies. Until the age of twenty chronological 
age and educational age correlated almost perfectly, r(444) = .96, p < .001, but the 
correlation was (almost significantly) negative for people over the age of twenty, r(54) = -
.24, p = .08. The lack of significance of this latter correlation is probably due to the small 
number of people aged older than twenty in the study samples. The relations between these





Correlations between Sample-, Country-, and Study-Level Characteristics 
Characteristics 
Chronological 
age < 20 yr 
Chronological 




Sample characteristics     
   Educational age .96*** -.24   
Country characteristics     
   Gross National Product -.01 -.00 .04  
   Educational permeation -.05 .10 .05 .79*** 
Study characteristics     
   Year of publication -.13** .21** -.19*** -.08* 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
characteristics and Raven performance are addressed in the next section. 
Table 3 presents the correlations between Raven performance and seven of the 
sample, study and country characteristics. As can be seen at the top of the Table, sample 
and country characteristics are significantly related. At sample level, both chronological 
age for people that are younger than twenty years and educational age correlated 
significantly with performance, r(614) = .23, p < .001 and r(514) = .56, p < .001, 
respectively. At country level, educational permeation and Gross National Product 
correlated positively with performance on the Raven, r(709) = .25, p < .001 and r(709) = 
.16, p < .001, respectively. These two positive correlations suggest that basic educational 
and everyday conditions of countries can statistically account for a relevant part of cross-
cultural differences in performance on the Raven. 
The Flynn effect would be observed if test performance and year of publication are
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p < .001. aAll scores were transformed from their raw mean to a 0-100 scale and then 
averaged across the Advanced, Colored, and Standard Versions. bThe partial correlation 




positively associated. As can be seen Figure 1, the relation is weak (though marginally 
significant), r(798) = .07, p = .05. The weakness of the relation could be a consequence of 
moderators not accounted for. More specifically, the educational situation of samples may 
be crucial, both in terms of participants’ educational age as in terms of countries’ 
educational permeation. Educational age was positively related to performance, but as 
shown in Table 2, educational age was negatively related to year of publication. When 
educational age and educational permeation were included as controlling variables in the 
estimation, the correlation between Raven performance and year of publication became .22 
(p < .001). Thus, after controlling for sample- and country-related educational 
characteristics, we observed the expected Flynn effect in performance on Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices. 
The importance of sample and country characteristics in moderating the Flynn effect 




is further underscored in a regression analysis. Performance on the Raven was the 
dependent variable, while year of publication, educational age, and educational permeation 
were predictors. The proportion of explained variance in performance is large, R2 = .41, p 
< .001. The relation between educational age and performance is strong and significant (β 
= .59, p < .001). Educational permeation has a somewhat smaller effect on performance, 
but the effect is still significant (β = .26, p < .001). A small, though salient Flynn effect can 
be derived from the positive relation between performance and year of publication (β = 
.18, p < .001). The regression analysis demonstrates that while the zero-order correlations 
of our predictors with Raven performance are not significant, the regression coefficients 
(that can be viewed as partial correlations) are significant. 
The regression analysis implies that the Flynn effect is universal. A final analysis 
addressed this claim in more detail by testing the presence of the effect in individual 
countries. A country was included in the analysis if data from this country met three 
criteria: The country should be present in the dataset in at least 20 samples; data of the 
country should be collected on at least two independent occasions; data of the country 
should have a minimum dispersion of 14 years from the earliest to the latest occasion. 
Eight of out 45 countries in the dataset met all criteria (namely Australia, Canada, the 
former West-Germany, India, Iran, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States). For 
each country a separate regression analysis was conducted with year of publication and 
educational age as predictors and Raven test score as dependent variable. The results are 
presented in Table 4. Canada showed a significantly negative regression coefficient for 
year of publication. This might signify a reversed Flynn effect, but this cannot be assured 
from the present analysis. United Kingdom was the only affluent country with a salient 
Flynn effect. The largest Flynn effects were found in India, Iran, and Poland. The size of 
the Flynn effect showed a significantly negative correlation with the Gross National 
Product of the country, r(8) = -.74, p < .05. Unfortunately, countries from Africa and South 
America were only measured at single occasions. We do not know whether the negative 
correlation extends to developing countries. It can be concluded that our data suggest a 
temporal patterning in the Flynn effect; the effect was first observed in Western countries 
where it may have reached its ceiling, while countries with a lower, though increasing





Size of the Flynn Effect by Country (Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Country Frequency Β R2 
 Years Samples   
Australia 7 35 -.26 .33** 
Canada 8 20 -.52** .68*** 
Germany (West) 8 25 -.05 .40* 
India 8 41 .62*** .44*** 
Iran 2 22 .64*** .95*** 
Poland 5 72 .55*** .60*** 
United Kingdom 14 129 .53*** .52*** 
United States 17 99 -.01 .20** 
*
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
level of economic development show a more pronounced Flynn effect. 
 
Discussion 
We examined the associations between performance on Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices with various education-related country characteristics and year of publication. A 
total of 193 publications were included in our meta-analysis, which contained 798 
independent samples from 45 countries and covering a history of 60 years. This 
considerable variation in countries and years of publication is crucial for testing the cross-
cultural generalizability of the Flynn effect. A regression analysis showed that year of 
publication has a relation with Raven performance that is independent of individuals’ 




educational age and country’s educational permeation. Moreover, educational age was the 
best predictor of Raven performance. These analyses revealed that each of the three 
variables created unique patterns of change and thus tap into different aspects of 
performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
Our analysis suggests the Flynn effect is not an artifact of the on average higher 
levels of education of samples in countries with growing economies (that tend to invest 
more in education). Yet, a growth in economic development and the accompanying larger 
investment in education could boost the size of the Flynn effect if the development would 
not be accounted for in the analyses. The current study suggests that three factors are 
independently associated with an increase in Raven scores: educational permeation, 
educational age, and publication year. Two of these factors, educational permeation and 
educational age, will often act in concert; economic growth over an extended period will 
often lead to more educational permeation and to an increase of the average educational 
age of a population. If the Flynn effect is observed in a country with a substantial 
economic development in the period of observation, the size of the effect may be boosted 
by the economic development. 
The current study suggests that differences in Raven scores should not be 
interpreted only from the individual-level perspective. Also important are test and country 
characteristics. The Raven, as do many other tests, may contain elements that show 
differential suitability across cultures (Van de Vijver, 1997). The present study provides 
support for this perspective. The contribution of educational permeation to performance in 
addition to the Flynn effect, which we found in the present analysis, suggests that factors 
such as test bias and need for achievement might play a role in cross-cultural differences in 
Raven test scores. 
The Flynn effect was independent from education-related characteristics, which 
suggests that it is an effect that is present in all countries represented in our meta-analysis. 
One critical question that emerges after our analysis is whether there was enough temporal 
and cross-cultural variation in the data set to assert the universality of the Flynn effect. It 
could be argued that a sample size of 45 countries is sizeable; however, the cultural 
variation in this sample is not optimal. An inspection of Table 1 suggests that affluent 




Western countries and developing countries are overrepresented; moreover, it is only for 
some, mainly Western, countries that a sizeable variation in years of publication is 
available. As a consequence, one could argue that the variability in our data set is limited. 
Still, our data suggest that Flynn effect is not linked to Western societies alone and is 
independent of individual-level and country-level education-related factors. 
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Schooling and Everyday Cognitive 
Development among Kharwar Children in 
India: A Natural Experiment 
 
 
The confounding of chronological and educational age and of schooling and 
socioeconomic status are persistent problems in the study of the cognitive 
consequences of schooling. The educational system among the Kharwar in India 
provides a natural experiment to overcome these problems, since it shows neither 
source of confounding. The sample comprised of 201 schooled and unschooled 
Kharwar children from six to nine years of age. The test battery contained tests of 
mathematics and memory with formal and local stimulus content, as well as tests of 
inductive reasoning, analogies, fluency, picture vocabulary, and numbers. 
Confirmatory factor analyses supported similar hierarchical factor structures, with 
general intelligence in the apex, for both unschooled and schooled children. The per 
annum score increments of chronological age were about twice as large as those of 
educational age. These findings illustrate the important role of everyday 
experiences in the development of basic features of cognitive functioning. 
 
 
Schooling is a setting where teachers and pupils conspire to elevate pupils’ degree of 
generalization. This "conspiracy" is motivated by the perception that generalization offers 
an advantage in the processing of cognitive tasks that cannot be achieved with unique rules 
for each task. Despite this perception, the psychological foundation of cognitive 
generalization in school is underexposed. Broadly speaking, there is disagreement about 




the mechanisms that can explain the effect of schooling. Comparisons of school-attending 
and unschooled children can easily lead to "great divide models" of schooling effects, in 
which observed differences between these two groups of children are often interpreted as 
qualitatative in nature (Tulviste, 1991; Vygotsky, 1978). We propose that this type of 
comparison cannot reveal the effects of schooling adequately. Schooling effects, like 
cross-cultural differences, are less dichotomous and more continuous than assumed in 
studies contrasting schooled and unschooled individuals (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & 
Dasen, 2002). Therefore, we propose that a comparison of the effects of educational age 
and chronological age might be a better approach for unraveling the cognitive 
consequences of schooling and everyday experiences. However, such a comparison 
appears difficult to implement in practice. Western-based studies may only employ highly 
correlated measures of chronological and educational age, which seriously limits their 
power to disentangle cognitive effects of both kinds of age. Non-Western studies show 
another confounding, educational age tends to be related to socioeconomic status in these 
studies. In the present study we take advantage of a specific setting in India, in which 
neither educational and chronological age, nor schooling and status are confounded, 
allowing a study design that avoids the usual limitations of schooling effect studies 
(Mishra & Dasen, 2004).  
A need to disentangle educational age from chronological age stems from 
observations that each has unique contributions to similarities and differences in cognitive 
development. The contributions of chronological age were predominantly addressed by 
Piaget (1947/2001). He holds that children gradually assimilate operations, such as 
manipulations of objects and symbols like addition and conservation, and that these 
operations together constitute their level of operativity. Schooling effect studies tend to 
address differences in general level of operativity, also labeled psychometric g (Case, 
Demetriou, Platsidou, & Kazi, 2001), between school-attending and unschooled children. 
Contributions of educational age were virtually pretty much neglected by Piaget, but are 
central in Vygotsky’s (1978) work. He proposes that schooled literacy leads to a 
qualitative jump in children’s level of operativity. In our view, an underexposed aspect in 
the discussion of the effects of schooling is the sequence in which experiences of everyday 




and school appear in children’s lives. Experiences with cognitive operations during 
everyday settings tend to precede experiences with the same operations in school. 
Although everyday experiences stimulate the acquisition of operations, they do not bring 
the development process to fruition (Case, 1985, 1992). Schooling adds to the child’s skill 
to apply an operation by teaching strategies and other transfer-enhancing tools.  
Research of the past few decades has shown that the development of operations 
does not automatically include knowledge about how to apply them. Strategies that help to 
apply operations only seem to emerge during clear-cut practice in well-defined 
environments (Case, 1992; Dasen & Heron, 1981). The role of school as just one particular 
context for the development of strategies has been demonstrated by Posner (1982) in her 
examination of the arithmetical skills of five to ten year old children of two tribes in Ivory 
Coast that differ in exposure to everyday arithmetic. Schooled and unschooled children of 
both groups were equally skilled in executing basic arithmetical operations, such as 
addition, signifying the effects of everyday experiences on the overall level of operativity. 
Still, children without much everyday experience in arithmetic started to use more efficient 
strategies when they had attended school. The use of efficient strategies allows children to 
perform closer to their true potential. Sternberg et al. (2002) examined the utility of 
providing school-attending children from a rural area in Tanzania with strategies that 
helped to work more efficiently. Significant gains in reasoning were observed. Posttest 
scores were much better predictors of reference measures of mental ability than were 
pretest scores. Beneficial effects of test strategies are widely found in cross-cultural 
psychology (Ombrédane, Robaye, & Plumail, 1956; Van de Vijver, Daal, & Van 
Zonneveld, 1986). 
We propose that schooling creates its own domains of strategic knowledge. This 
view is illustrated in the work of Lave (1980/1997). She showed that schooled Liberian 
adults found it difficult to use their numerosity skill when solving mathematical tasks that 
were embedded in tailoring tasks and they indeed performed worse than unschooled 
Liberian tailors. Schooling does not induce transfer to other tasks by forming operations at 
higher levels of operativity. Working with the Vai of Liberia, Scribner and Cole (1981) 
compared the cognitive test performance of illiterate adults without schooling, literate 




adults without schooling, and literate adults that were formally schooled. Literates in Vai 
deviated from illiterates in small, but consistent ways. Differences concerned the specific 
syllabic characteristics of the Vai script, and did not transfer to more remote tasks. High 
levels of specificity in differences between schooled and unschooled literates of an 
indigenous script were replicated among the Cree in Canada by Berry and Bennett (1991). 
Schooling affords children with tangible gains in development that typically focus on their 
efficient problem solving strategies and not on their operativity (Case et al., 2001; 
Ferguson, 1956; Mishra, Sinha, & Berry, 1996; Schliemann, Carrahar, & Ceci, 1997; Van 
de Vijver, 2002).  
Three distinct types of psychometric studies are usually employed to examine 
schooling effects on development (Ceci, 1990, 1991; Christian et al., 2001; Crone & 
Whitehurst, 1999; Stelzl, Merz, Ehlers, & Remer, 1995). The first two have only been 
conducted in Western countries: summer holiday and birthday cutoff studies. Summer 
holiday studies have shown that a sustained absence of schooling during the summer 
holiday leads to a decline in cognitive test performance (Ceci, 1990). Birthday cutoff 
studies provide two different comparisons. First, such studies compare relatively young 
with relatively old first-graders. This comparison shows convergence of the performance 
of the younger and older pupils after one year of schooling. Second, they compare children 
at the end of the first grade with children of about the same age who are not yet enrolled. A 
year of schooling leads to a difference in performance between the two groups of children 
(Ceci, 1991; Stelzl et al., 1995). However, both summer holiday and birthday cutoff 
studies only employ measures of educational age and group differences in scores over brief 
time periods; these studies cannot address the long-term effects of schooling over and 
above everyday experience.  
The third type is usually carried out in developing countries that have moderate 
levels of school attendance because of low enrolment or high dropout rates. These studies 
employ indicators of group educational age and chronological age that are less strongly 
related (e.g., Serpell, 1993). However, in such countries school attendance is usually 
related to socioeconomic status (Rogoff, 1981). Only high-status families are able or 
willing to pay the school fee. Confounding of status and school attendance may lead to a 




selection bias in a comparison of schooled and unschooled individuals (Ceci & Williams, 
1997). Compared to unschooled children, school-attending children probably have a more 
stimulating family background and more frequent exposure to literacy before school 
attendance. Thus, the natural contexts of these studies do not provide a complete 
disentanglement of chronological and educational age and hence, their validity can be 
challenged. 
We propose a fourth type of psychometric design: natural experiments (Scheier, 
1959). A natural experiment takes place at a site where threats to common designs do not 
exist (Mishra & Dasen, 2004). A natural experiment of schooling effects is provided by a 
context in which chronological and educational dates are not confounded. Examples of 
natural experiments of schooling effects among adults are studies by Scribner and Cole 
(1981) and Berry and Bennett (1991). Our study addresses schooling effects in children. 
Among the Kharwar of rural Uttar Pradesh (Northeastern India), age of enrollment into 
primary education varies considerably, enabling the recruitment of children with various 
combinations of educational and chronological age. For example, we included seven-year 
old children without any schooling, with one year of schooling, and with two years of 
schooling. Moreover, selection biases that typically challenge a comparison of school-
attending and unschooled children are small: all participants in the study are from the same 
(lowest) caste and socioeconomic status is relatively homogeneous among villagers. It is 
clear that this research site avoids the common confounds of educational and chronological 
age, and of schooling and social and economic status.  
Two hypotheses are tested. First, we expect that unschooled and school-attending 
children will perform at the same level on our embedded tests (i.e., instruments that were 
specifically developed for the Kharwar by employing items that were close to their 
everyday experiences), while the school-attending children will outperform unschooled 
children on the formal tests (i.e., tests with a more school-related content). Second, we 
expect that the type of instruction that is specific to a schooling context has no effect on 
cognitive development beyond the effect provided by everyday experience. This 
expectation implies that educational age does not predict individual differences in 
performance better than chronological age. 






The study was carried out among the Kharwar, a cultural group living around the 
border that divides southeast Uttar Pradesh from western Jharkhand. The sample in this 
study was drawn from nine villages located on a forested plateau south of the Ganges-
valley. A few years ago, these villages were part of Varanasi district, but now they are part 
of a newly created district called Chandauli. The villages are contained in the Naugarh 
Block area, which is the remotest region of Chandauli district. Situated at a distance of 
about 100 km south of the city of Varanasi the whole region is still quite underdeveloped. 
The region is generally inhospitable and the villages are isolated and inaccessible. Naugarh 
is a small market place that caters to the day-to-day needs of villages situated at distances 
between 8 to 25 km. Roads from Naugarh to neighboring villages are in a poor state or are 
absent altogether. Due to this isolation, people have very little exposure to the outside 
world. Animism is the predominant belief system, but Hindu rituals and festivals are also 
observed and celebrated. 
The Kharwar have a subsistence level of economy that is based on growing rice and 
gathering produce in the forest, although the latter is in decline because of governmental 
prohibition on the use of forest resources. The villagers have to depend largely on rain-fed 
crops, because the soil has very little water retention capacity and the facilities for 
irrigation are meager. Being close to the forest the crops also attract wild animals. As a 
result, the villagers usually have agricultural produce that is barely enough for three to four 
months. For the rest of the year, they have to depend on forest resources and animals. Food 
patterns depend on the season, brought about by the availability of forest produce and the 
scarcity of agricultural products like rice in the months following the monsoon season. 
People in the villages thus also talk about "food months" (when the food is in abundance) 
and "hunger months" (when there is very little food available). Malnutrition is common 
among children. Due to the lack of safe drinking water, diarrhea is an important health 
hazard. 
In the Kharwar community, all children are expected and encouraged to participate 
in a variety of everyday chores and activities and in this way parents promote the 




development of operations in their children from an early age. As a consequence, all 
children have experiences that foster such operations like conservation, causality, and 
seriation, all of which can be expected to contribute to children’s overall level of 
operativity during development. Social events such as taking care of babies and running 
errands make children aware of the relationships between antecedents and consequences 
and even though this is a particular event with unique causes, it might lead to the 
expectation of causality in many other settings and reasoning processes as well 
(Tomasello, 1999). Purchasing of small items from local shops does not only provide 
exposure to causality but also requires children to carry out simple arithmetical procedures. 
As villages border immediately on forests and fields, children also have close experience 
of their natural surroundings, prevailing weather and the effects of rain and drought, 
presumably also supporting the development of causality and conservation. Counting skills 
are generally more pronounced in the herding of livestock, which is an important activity 
that children are engaged in, initially with adults, later independently. Although livestock 
is the property of individual families, they are looked after collectively and as such 
children learn to the count animals that belong to them and those that belong to other 
families. The major activity of children is the collection of an indigenous type of nut from 
the forest. This nut grows at the heart of the leaves of a particular tree, but is only ready to 
be collected when the leaves have colored yellow. Children thus learn to be sensitive to the 
color of leaves. Sensitivity to the peculiarities of leaves is also useful for the production of 
plates and cups. Since the plates and cups will later serve actual purposes, their 
construction has to follow exact patterns and children learn to thread together leaves with 
the help of small twigs according to predetermined patterns. In summary, the everyday life 
of Kharwar children can be viewed as providing a variety of cognitive stimulants that serve 
to produce growth in overall level of operativity. 
Education has been introduced fairly recently in this region. Because of a strict 
reliance on agricultural and gathering occupations in this region, there is no demand for 
jobs requiring formal education. Having livestock is a guarantee for milk products, eggs, or 
wool, which can be used for own consumption or for trade. Being educated does not 
guarantee alternative means of acquiring of consumptive products. For this reason schools 




were met with a high degree of skepticism at their introduction, but during the last decade 
interest has grown by way of social and agricultural developmental work. Moreover, the 
Indian government provides parents and the community with a variety of incentives to 
send children to school. Poverty and status are not related to the enrollment in and 
attendance of school. Children can be enrolled into school at the start of the school year at 
any age following their sixth birthday. It is common to find children of different ages at the 




Two-hundred-and-one children between the ages of six and nine years took part in 
this study. Children were recruited by a local NGO. Following detailed pointers about the 
natural experiment of this study, a collaborator from this NGO traveled to many villages to 
check for availability of children, and a list was compiled. Parents of children eligible for 
enrollment in the study were consulted and their permission was requested. No financial 
compensation was provided. Diversity in age of enrollment and availability of unschooled 
children at successive ages enable a study of the independent effects of chronological and 
educational age. In Table 1 the distribution of the fourteen groups and the exact number of 




We aimed at measuring the children’s overall level of operativity directly as it is 
assumed to constitute children’s total amount of growth over a given period of time. 
Because psychometric g is equivalent to overall level of operativity (Case et al., 2001) and 
psychometric tests may be easier to administer in a battery like-style than more complex 
Piagetian tasks, psychometric tests were developed. A broad range of psychometric 
measures were chosen from Carroll’s (1993) model of cognitive ability. This model of 
human cognitive abilities by Carroll is based on a re-analysis and integration of over 460 
data sets, found in the factor-analytic literature. In the model, domains of reasoning, verbal

























































































aThe numbers of boys and girls are placed between the brackets. 
 
 
learning, memory and others are a midlevel between more specific measures and 
psychometric g. Seven cognitive instruments plus a biographical questionnaire were 
administered to children. For two instruments both formal and embedded versions were 
developed, making a total of nine tests (see Table 2 for an overview). 
Inductive Reasoning. The measurement of formal inductive reasoning was done 
using Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices. It was chosen here since it is appropriate for 
research with participants from cultures who are unfamiliar with the more abstract format 
of the Standard Version. The Colored Version includes 36 matrices arranged in three sets 
of 12 matrices, in varying difficulty. For the present purpose a shortened version with two





Overview of the Instruments 
Domain   Instruments 
  Inductive Reasoning Subset of Raven Colored Progressive Matrices 
  Embedded Analogies  Prediction and postdiction across time 
  Picture Vocabulary  Recognition of pictured objects 
  Fluency  Enumerating items from questioned categories 
  Numbers   Counting of pictured objects 
  Formal Embedded 
  Mathematics School-like math problems Story-embedded math problems 
  Memory Span Free recall of words Free recall of objects 
 
 
example matrices and 18 scored matrices was employed. The number of items was reduced 
because a pilot study showed that the administration of the full version discouraged the 
children, which carried over to consecutive tests. The internal consistency (Cronbach's 
alpha) was .70. 
Embedded Analogies. In order to measure embedded reasoning Sternberg and 
Kalmar (1998) developed an instrument dealing with state changes of objects. Each item 
involved an object in a particular state and subjects had to predict the future state of that 
object or postdict its past state by choosing one of three displayed states on a computer 
screen. Four items with a similar layout as Sternberg and Kalmar's, but now using small, 
concrete models of real-life objects familiar to children in this cultural setting, were 
developed for the present study: (1) What will be the length of this girl in two years from 
now? (2) What will be the level of water in this bottle in one month from now? (3) What 




was the color of this yellow leaf three days ago? (4) What will be the length of this tree in 
ten years from now? Children could choose from three alternatives. Internal consistency 
was .40. This value was low, probably due to the small number of items.  
Mathematics. Children were asked nine mathematical questions in two different 
ways. In the formal manner the same kind of questions were asked as in school, such as: 
"How much is two plus two?" The same questions were also embedded in stories, such as: 
"Sawita saw two birds this morning and two this afternoon. How many birds did she see 
today?" The nine test items consisted of three additions, three subtractions, and three 
multiplications. All items were open-ended and scored as either correct or incorrect. The 
internal consistency was .87 for the formal and .86 for the embedded version. 
Picture Vocabulary. Fourteen pictures were taken from children's posters. The 
objects these pictures depicted were familiar to the children in this age group and culture. 
Children had to name these pictures. When the object was named correctly, a score of two 
points was given; when the response was incorrect but fell in the same category (e.g., 
naming a melon an orange) one point was given; in other cases no point was given. For 
each child the sum was calculated. The internal consistency was .65. 
Fluency. Children were asked to enumerate as many objects as possible from three 
different categories: things to eat, animals, and boys' and girls' names. The number of 
correct objects per category was determined and summed to a total score. The internal 
consistency, measured as the correlation across the three category scores, was .40. 
?umbers. Three drawings (depicting three pots, eight faces, and seventeen birds, 
respectively) were created and presented to the children. These were asked to count the 
number of objects in each drawing. The three items were scored as either correct or 
incorrect. The internal consistency was .52. 
Memory Span. This test has two forms. First, a formal version using twelve words 
with three words coming from four categories each: food, beauty products, tools, and 
animals. The words were read slowly in a random order, after which the child was asked to 
recall the words. Second, an embedded version using twelve concrete objects from the 
same categories as the words. The objects were taken randomly from a bag and put in front 
of the child. After the last was shown the objects were covered with a towel and the child 




was asked to recall the objects. All correctly recalled words and objects were scored as one 
and the missing as zero. The correlation between the number of correctly recalled words 
and the number of correctly recalled objects was calculated as indicator of internal 
consistency of the memory span test. This correlation was r(201) = .40, p < .01. 
Socioeconomic characteristics. A questionnaire was administered to assess several 
socioeconomic characteristics, including the educational level of the father, the number of 
siblings, and the number of livestock the father owns. 
 
Procedure 
The tests were administered individually. Duration of the administration of the tests 
took approximately one hour for each child. Data collection was done over a period of five 
weeks in November and December 2001. 
Three experienced experimenters administered the tests. They belonged to the local 
community, had ten years of schooling, and each one worked as a primary school teacher 
in one of the villages. Thus, these experimenters were well known to the children and their 
cultural practices, which presumably helped to reduce test anxiety in the participating 




In order to examine the dimensionality of the socioeconomic characteristics, 
educational level of the father, number of siblings, and number of livestock owned by the 
father were factor analyzed. A first factor was found with an eigenvalue of 1.19, explaining 
40% of the variance. Educational level of the father had a loading of -.77, number of 
siblings a loading of -.72, and the amount of livestock owned by the father a loading of 
.30. The factor was labeled Status. 
Table 3 shows the correlations between the background variables (age, grade, 
gender, and status). The correlation between age and status was small, though significant, 
r(201) = .16, p < .05; parents with higher status send their children to school at a later age. 
As expected in our design, which recruited children from the lowest caste and from a small





Correlations between the Background Variables 
  Age Grade Gender 
Grade .48**   
Gender -.06 -.05  
Status .16* .03 .00 
*
p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 
number of homogeneous villages, the correlation between grade (being unschooled is 
scored as zero) and status was not significant, r(201) = .03, p = .73. There was a positive 
and significant correlation between age and schooling, r(201) = .48, p < .01. This 
correlation, which may seem unexpected, is a consequence of the incomplete crossing of 
both variables, as indicated in the triangular shape of the design of Table 1. A fully 
factorial design would have required the inclusion of impossible combinations (e.g., 
children of six years of age with four years of schooling). It may be noted that the positive 
correlation does not challenge the adequacy of the study design (and hence, the 
interpretability of the results), as each group has a sizable number of children with a 
specific combination of age and amount of schooling, thus enabling a regression analysis 
with orthogonal coefficients for chronological and educational age. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Differences in performance on the formal tasks and embedded tasks. 
The hypothesis was tested in two different analyses of variance with repeated measures. 
The first tested the within-subject differences on the measures that have both a formal and 
an embedded version. For Mathematics and Memory Span both versions had the same 
number of items. The main effect of test version is highly significant, Wilks' Lambda = 
.57, F(1, 200) = 147.69, p < .01. The measures showed an effect in line with expectation: 




performance on Embedded Mathematics was significantly higher than on Formal 
Mathematics, Wilks' Lambda = .74, F(1, 200) = 70.14, p < .01; and Object Span was 
significantly longer than Word Span, Wilks' Lambda = .75, F(1, 200) = 66.06, p < .01.  
The second analysis added schooling (two levels: school-attending vs. unschooled 
children) as a between-subject factor, which allowed for a comparison of the relative 
performance on the embedded tests separately for schooled (? = 156) and unschooled (? = 
45) children, using chronological age as covariate. The gap between schooled and 
unschooled children was significantly smaller for Embedded Mathematics than for Formal 
Mathematics, Wilks' Lambda = .98, F(1, 200) = 4.17, p < .04; yet, the proportion of 
variance accounted for by this factor is small (.02). Memory Span did not show 
this differentiation, Wilks' Lambda = 1.00, F(1, 200) = .28, p < .66. Only the Mathematics 
test behaved fully in line with the first hypothesis. The performance difference on formal 
and embedded tests seems to be equal for schooled and unschooled children.  
Intermezzo: Clustering of the test measures. Confirmatory factor analysis was used 
to test an a priori specified model based on Carroll's (1993) hierarchical intelligence 
model. The nine tests were taken to constitute the lowest level and (with the exception of 
the Raven) to cluster into three second-level domains: Conceptual Reasoning, 
Mathematics, and Memory. The domains of Conceptual Reasoning and Mathematics were 
assumed to make up Crystallized Intelligence, which is the part of intelligence that 
contains information learned during development. The Raven is not included until the 
highest level, where it clusters together with Crystallized Intelligence and Memory into g, 
general intelligence.  
In order to test this conceptual model, two empirical models were tested: one 
standardized per chronological age group (because the expected relation between age and 
test-performance could otherwise induce an age factor) and one standardized per 
educational age group. Figure 1 shows the results of both factor analyses. Both models 
showed an excellent fit. The fit statistics of the model standardized per chronological age 
group were: χ2(23, ? = 201) = 27.20, p = .25, the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = .98, the 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .03, and the Goodness of Fit Index 
(GFI) = .97. The fit statistics of the model that was standardized per educational age group
 
.60 / .72 
.91 / .88 
.99 / 1.05 
.78 / .66 
.75 / .75 
.52 / .61 
.52 / .51 
.84 / .83 
.78 / .84 
.52 / .56 
.43 / .30 
 
.82 / .86 






















Figure 1. Path model between the nine observed variables and the four hierarchically arranged cognitive constructs (standardized solution). 
?otes. The coefficients in regular font are based on the standardization per chronological age; the coefficients in italics are based on the 
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were: χ2(23, ? = 201) = 25.91, p = .31, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .03, and GFI = .97. In both 
models all factor loadings were positive and significant. The two models cannot be tested 
for their equivalence, since they are based on the same group of children, but the large 
overlap in the analyses suggests that the cognitive structure as measured by the test battery 
is identical across educational and chronological age. 
The loadings of g in Figure 1 may not seem in line with the current literature 
(Carroll, 1993) as Crystallized Intelligence is a better indicator of g than is the Raven. The 
relatively high loading of crystallized components on g may be due to their extensive 
representation in the current battery. As a consequence, g may contain more aspects of 
crystallized intelligence than would be obtained in a test battery containing a larger 
number of fluid tasks. 
 Hypothesis 2: The relationships of age and grade with performance. A path model 
was used to evaluate the relationships between age, grade, status, and gender on the one 
hand, and the three cognitive domains on the other. Based on the taxonomy of the 
cognitive tests of Figure 1, non-standardized scores were computed for the Raven, 
Crystallized Intelligence, and Memory. These were used here as (observed) output scores, 
which together make up a latent variable called g. The background variables were used as 
predictors of g and the output measures (see Figure 2). The fit of the model is excellent: 
χ2(6, ? = 201) = 7.96, p = .24, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .04, and GFI = .99.  
Standardized path coefficients are shown in Figure 2. The relationship between 
chronological age and g is strong (ß = .65) and significant (p < .01). It was surprising to 
find a relationship between Gender and g (ß = .28, p < .01); girls performed poorer than 
boys. Grade did not have a relationship with g. The proportion of explained variance in g is 
large, R2 = .53, p < .01. 
A casual glance at Figure 2 might incorrectly convey the impression that age is not 
related to the Raven, Crystallized Intelligence, and Memory. However, the relation 
between age and these factors is not direct, but goes through g. The net relationship 
between Age and the Raven is .42 (p < .01), which is the product of the significant path 
coefficients between Age and g (.65) and between g and the Raven (.64). A bootstrap 
procedure confirmed the significance of this indirect effect. Grade was not related to the
 































Figure 2. Path model of the regression of the four observed indicators on the four hierarchically arranged cognitive constructs (standardized 
solution). ?ote. The effect of Gender on Raven is not significant. All other coefficients are significant (p < .01). 
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Raven. The direct relationship between Gender and Raven was not significant, ß = .10, 
t(200) = 1.79, ns. Girls did not score significantly lower on the Raven than boys. This may 
indicate that the earlier observed difference between boys and girls in g is probably due to 
the prominence of a crystallized element in g. The proportion of predicted variance of the 
Raven was .47, which is substantial.  
Grade was significantly related to Crystallized Intelligence, ß = .36, p < .01. The net 
relation between Age and Crystallized Intelligence was .47 (.65 x .72), which is 
significant. Thus, Crystallized Intelligence was not more influenced by Grade than by Age. 
The relation between Status and Crystallized Intelligence was negative but significant, ß = 
-.10, p < .01. The combination of g, Grade, and Status predicted 81% of the variance of 
Crystallized Intelligence, which is a very large number.  
The direct relationship between Grade and Memory was positive and significant (ß 
= .17, p < .01), while the indirect relationship between Age and Memory obtained a much 
higher value of .39 (.65 x .60), which is significant. Grade and g together predicted 45% of 
the variance of Memory. In summary, the model confirms the second hypothesis. The 
model of Figure 2 does not give any evidence for the often assumed large influence of 
schooling on intelligence domains and on g in particular. 
A more detailed account of the relationship between test performance and 
chronological and educational age can be derived form Table 4, in which the effect sizes 
(Cohen's d) of all nine test measures for ages 7, 8, and 9, and grades 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 
given. The effect sizes were calculated as the mean of the group of interest minus the mean 
of the reference group (defined as the previous age or grade) divided by their pooled 
standard deviation. The means used in calculating the effect sizes were generated by 
carrying out two analyses of covariance; in the first chronological age was the grouping 
variable and grade the covariate, and in the second grade was the grouping variable and 
chronological age the covariate. The computation of adjusted scores is necessary for 
allowing the differences in the means to be attributed to their grouping variable without the 
confounding of the covariate. The covariance analyses confirmed the overall distinction 
between chronological and educational age: Across age all test measures except Fluency 
differed significantly, whereas across grade Raven and Memory Span for Words did not





Effect Sizes per Age and per Grade for All Test Measures 
   Agea, b  Gradea, c  
      7 8 9 M  1 2 3 4 M  
Inductive Reasoning   .35 .25 .54 .38 ** .39 -.15 .10 -.10 .06  
Embedded Analogies .22 .35 .09 .22 * .10 .53 .12 -.19 .14 ** 
Mathematics            
  Formal   .23 .69 .38 .43 ** .48 .41 .47 .42 .44 ** 
  Embedded  .30 1.08 .29 .56 ** .52 .11 .29 -.25 .17 ** 
Picture Vocabulary  .01 .47 .23 .24 ** .72 .16 .23 -.11 .25 ** 
Fluency   -.02 -.16 .00 -.06  -.41 .62 .16 .30 .17 ** 
Numbers  .36 .71 .24 .44 ** .57 .33 -.19 -.08 .16 ** 
Memory Span             
  Words   .50 .40 .09 .33 ** -.21 .51 -.16 -.09 .01  
  Objects   .40 .29 .26 .32 ** -.11 .03 .66 .40 .24 ** 
M   .26 .45 .24 .32  .23 .28 .19 .03 .18  
aEach previous age or grade is taken as the reference group. bThe effect is corrected for 
grade. cThe effect is corrected for chronological age. ?ote. Asterisks indicate that mean 
effect sizes differ significantly from zero: *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 
show significantly different group means. Values of Cohen's d were larger for age than for 
grade: For age, all effects except one (Fluency) were larger than 0.2 (the cutoff value of a 




small effect size); the effect size of embedded Mathematics was even larger than 0.5 (the 
cutoff value of a medium effect size); for grade only three out of nine (formal 
Mathematics, Picture Vocabulary, and Memory Span for Objects) showed effect sizes 
larger than 0.2. Overall, the effects of chronological age were about twice as large as the 
effects of educational age. Similar patterns of results were obtained when the analyses 
were performed on individual items (rather than test scores), but these results are not 
presented here for the sake of space. 
 
Discussion 
This study attempted to disentangle the effects of everyday experiences and 
schooling on cognitive test performance. Research carried out in Western countries cannot 
lead to an accurate estimate of the cognitive consequence of schooling and everyday 
experience because of the strong positive correlation between educational and 
chronological age in countries with high school attendance. The study of schooling effects 
among the Kharwar in India provided a natural experiment to distinguish between the 
effects of the everyday environment and school. Neither socioeconomic status and school 
attendance, nor educational age and chronological age were confounded. Children with 
ages ranging from 6 to 9 and being unschooled or attending grades 1, 2, 3, and 4 were split 
into fourteen groups so as to constitute the sampling design given in Table 1. In line with 
contemporary thinking on the development of skills both embedded and formal tests were 
employed (Berry et al., 2002; Mishra, 1997; Schliemann et al., 1997). 
A straightforward comparison of unschooled and school-attending children yielded 
results partially similar to those obtained by birthday-cutoff studies. As hypothesized, it 
was found that school-attending and unschooled children scored higher on embedded tests 
than on formal tests. Furthermore, school-attending children scored higher than unschooled 
children, both on embedded and formal tests. The superior performance of school-
attending children can already be seen among six-year olds, which replicates findings of 
birthday-cutoff studies (Ceci, 1990, 1991; Stelzl et al., 1995). However, this higher 
performance of school-attending children should not be taken to imply that they think in a 
way that is qualitatively different from the way that unschooled children think. 




Standardization on either chronological age or educational age yielded similar factor 
structures, suggesting that there are no major qualitative differences between school-
attending and unschooled children in cognitive functioning in our sample. This evidence is 
in agreement with the cross-cultural literature, in which the structural equivalence of 
cognitive tests across many cultural groups with major differences in level of education is 
reported and a great divide of cognitive differences is challenged (cf. Berry et al., 2002; 
Irvine, 1979; Van de Vijver, 2002). Equivalence of cognitive structures across school-
attending and unschooled children thus validates Piaget's (1947/2001) claims that everyday 
experience through chronological age is the motor of the development of operations and 
that they are not subject to effects of educational age, as Vygotsky (1978) suggested. 
The direct comparison of the increases in performance on tests of general mental 
ability across educational age and chronological age shows that school attendance has a 
substantially smaller impact on competence than has the natural stimulation provided by 
everyday life. On average, the increase caused by one year of chronological age is twice 
the increase caused by one year of schooling. Moreover, schooling effects on tests of 
cognitive ability are confined to those cognitive domains that are somewhat removed from 
and less related to basic operativity (Carroll, 1993) and primarily benefit from the 
knowledge of factual details. Thus, the views of both Piaget (1947/2001) and Vygotsky 
were partly confirmed in the current study. We concur with Piaget in his view of the 
crucial role of chronological age in the development of operations; yet, his neglect of 
educational age is not fully justified. We concur with Vygotsky (1978) when he claimed 
that schooling has an effect on cognitive development; yet, in our comparison of 
educational and chronological age, the influence of the former is restricted and primarily 
related to strategies that are confined to school-related domains. Schooling induces the use 
of strategies without affecting children’s level of operativity (Posner, 1982). 
A drawback of a natural experiment such as the one presented here is that school 
quality cannot be manipulated. Even though just small amounts of schooling of only low 
quality have been shown to produce dramatic effects it cannot be denied whether a lower 
or higher quality in the schools of our study could have induced other school effects 
(Fuller & Clark, 1994). In a study of schooling effects, the effects of schooling might be 




larger, relative to the effects of chronological age, if variability in the quality of the schools 
in a chosen field site is higher. 
Despite this drawback of the quality of the schools in the current study, we are 
confident that our observations lend support to the emerging perception that stimulation 
provided by the setting of children, in which parents play a pivotal role, is sufficient for 
operations to emerge. As is increasingly appreciated, parents’ efforts to provide children 
with age-appropriate scaffolding and to have their children participate in chores such as 
fetching objects and running errands, is related to their ethnotheories of intelligence 
(Grigorenko et al., 2001; Ogunnaike & Houser, 2002). Many operations simply develop 
through parental scaffolding, while schooling helps children to acquire efficient strategies 
through the increased supply of factual information (Lave, 1980/1997; Posner, 1982; 
Scribner & Cole, 1981; Sternberg et al., 2002). Our focus on level of operativity permits us 
to transcend specialized capacities such as mathematics and address their concurrence in 
cognitive development with a single model. A core unit of operativity should be 
distinguished from manifestation in everyday practice when we describe the consequences 
of schooling. Universal potential may well be accompanied by cross-cultural differences in 
specific domains and lead to cross-culturally distinct forms and levels of development 
(Ferguson, 1956; Schliemann et al., 1997). 
Our study complements Scribner and Cole's (1981) study by relating children’s 
overall level of operativity to unconfounded measures of educational age and 
chronological age. We confirm that schooling broadens the field of application of thinking, 
but that it does not really constitute new thought processes. This point of view was already 
espoused in 1971 by Cole and Bruner: "The teacher should stop laboring under the 
impression that he must create new intellectual structures and start concentrating on how to 
get the child to transfer skills he already possesses to the task at hand" (Cole & Bruner, 
1971, p. 874). Generalization in school is thus very much a matter of provoking children to 
try their operations on a diversity of tasks. Children should be granted a much more active 
role in their own learning, with their teacher’s assuming a more facilitative role. 
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Everyday and School-Specificity of 
Representational Change: A Longitudinal 
Study among Kharwar Children in India 
 
 
Variation in children’s modes of development across chronological and educational 
age is studied in India by means of a two-wave longitudinal design with a three-
year interval among 191 children aged between 6 and 12 years. Effects of 
chronological and educational age could be estimated separately from each other. 
Five measures of implicit and explicit representation were administered. 
Confirmatory analyses revealed two processes of change: One that reflects 
children’s hierarchical construction of knowledge and another that reflects the 
actualization of knowledge across particulars. Analyses of the net development per 
year revealed a decrement of the effect of chronological age and an increase of the 
effect of educational age. This finding shows that novel input affects children at the 
end of middle childhood differently than it does young children. 
 
 
Children towards the end of middle childhood treat new information in a way that is quite 
different from that of very young children. For very young children new information is 
more associated with the categorization of behavior (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), human-made items (Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kemler 
Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 2000) and living kinds (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996, 
2002), whereas for children towards the end of middle childhood new information is more 




associated with the transfer of properties and the consideration of similarity (Barnett & 
Ceci, 2002; Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984; Sloutsky & 
Fisher, 2004). A shift from categorization to transfer may be deduced from different lines 
of research, but so far evidence of this shift has been circumstantial (Gelman & Williams, 
1998). In the present study we examine this shift more directly by comparing the effects of 
chronological and educational age in a two-wave longitudinal study with an interval of 
three years. Previous research found that both everyday and school experiences contribute 
to children’s development and that both predict the performance on intelligence tasks 
(Cahan & Cohen, 1989; Ceci, 1990). In an earlier cross-sectional study with schooled and 
unschooled children in India, we showed that chronological and educational age 
(respectively) relate more to competence and achievement facets of intelligence 
(Brouwers, Mishra, & Van de Vijver, 2006). A longitudinal design allows us to take a 
closer look at intra-individual processes of change and to see how chronological and 
educational age relate to this shift. 
To understand the nature of age-related change in cognitive development, 
psychologists have begun to examine the implicit and explicit character of representation 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; also see Dienes & Perner, 1999; Reber, 1989). Implicit 
representation reflects the intuitive understanding that a disparate collection of different 
elements relate to one another in concrete ways (Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & 
Kalish, 2000; Pine & Messer, 2000). Young children understand that integers are distinct 
marks on a scale (Le Corre, Van de Walle, Brannon, & Carey, 2006). Thus, looking at 
three dolls and seven toy balls, young children immediately recognize that there are more 
toy balls than dolls, even when they cannot justify this in explicit numbers. In contrast, 
explicit representation reflects conventions or rules that are extrinsic to the representation 
about how discrete units of information are assembled (Barsalou, 1985; Langacker, 1986). 
Thus, cooking a meal is led by considerations about food preferences, the costs of the 
ingredients, and the time it takes to prepare these. While all these elements taken together 
might lead to an implicit understanding of the purpose of the cook, to feed people, only an 
explicit understanding of the concrete actions will lead to the actual meal.  
To highlight the age-related shift in emphasis from implicit to explicit 




representation we juxtapose the chronological age and educational age trajectories 
(Larivée, Normandeau, & Parent, 2000). Originally, it was argued that change over time is 
linear (Robinson, Schmidt, & Teti, 2005). This argument, derived from the general 
developmental model proposed by Schaie (1965), suggests that chronological and 
educational age have the same influence and that there is no shift in emphasis from the 
former to the latter with more advanced levels of development. In contrast, more recent 
evidence suggests that developmental trajectories change shape through dynamic self-
organizing interaction (Fischer & Paré-Blagoev, 2000). Development is triggered by new 
input, which can lead to changes in either children’s implicit or explicit representation of 
that input. This change in their representation has consequences for the way that future 
input could trigger development. 
Changes due to chronological age are thought to be large in the beginning, but to 
gradually decline with age (Kail & Ferrer, 2007). Such a course of development is 
assumed to reflect a hierarchical construction of knowledge (Piaget, 1947/2001; also see 
Bradmetz, 1996; Case, 1991; Demetriou, Christou, Spanoudis, & Platsidou, 2002; Fischer 
& Immordino-Yang, 2002; Flavell, 1963). Illustrative of this course of development is 
research on essentialism (Gelman, 2003). Research has shown that certain concepts such as 
numerosity (Le Corre, Van de Walle, Brannon, & Carey, 2006), vitality of living kinds 
(Simons & Keil, 1995), and the sequence of events that underlie probability (Reber, 1989), 
are already present at very young ages, but that the concepts get more elaborated and 
differentiated as development continues. For example, children gradually differentiate their 
number concept, when they move from counting numbers on their fingers to basic retrieval 
strategies in order to solve arithmetic problems (Siegler, 1999, 2000). Changes across 
chronological age are thus best characterized as differentiation.  
Changes due to educational age are thought to be weak at the age of enrolment, but 
to increase gradually with the time spent in school (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-
Smith, Parisi, & Plunkett, 1996; Marcus, 1998, 2001; Van Geert, 1991). This route of 
development is thought to reflect the establishment of associations between existing 
explicit representation and new discrete units (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). Illustrative of 
this course of development is cross-cultural research (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 




2002), which has shown that the way by which people actualize their implicit 
representations tend to be highly specific to their culture (Cole, 1996), their context 
(Chavajay & Rogoff, 1999), and particular situations (Lave, 1988), but that the range of 
ways in which they may assemble their knowledge increases with every additional discrete 
unit. For example, Lave (1980/1997) showed that schooled Liberian adults found it 
difficult to use their numerosity skill when solving arithmetical tasks that were embedded 
in tailoring situations. They actually performed worse than the Liberian tailors who were 
not formally schooled. Also working in Liberia, but amongst the Vai, Scribner and Cole 
(1981) compared success on cognitive tests of illiterate adults that were unschooled, with 
that of literate adults that were unschooled, and literate adults that were unschooled. They 
showed that literates in Vai did not differ much from illiterates but syllabic characteristics 
of the Vai script did create small but stable advantages. Development across educational 
age is thus best characterized as actualization. 
This theoretical juxtaposition of chronological and educational age highlights the 
shift in emphasis of developmental processes, but the almost perfect correlation between 
both ages in cohorts of school-going children in developed countries makes it difficult to 
really tease apart their distinctive effects on representational development (cf. Flavell, 
Beach, & Chinsky, 1966). With such high correlations, autonomous effects of individual 
variables might not be identifiable (Cahan & Cohen, 1989; Ceci, 1990; MacKinnon, 
Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). In the present study, we make use of a natural experiment, which 
is here a setting where the population does not exhibit this confounding (Scheier, 1959). 
Some examples of natural experiments of school effects among adults are studies by 
Scribner and Cole (1981), which was discussed above, and Berry and Bennett (1991). Our 
study addresses schooling effects in children. Aim of the present study is to employ two-
wave longitudinal data to examine the effects of both chronological age and educational 
age without the often seen confounding of both ages (Mishra & Dasen, 2004).  
Data were collected among the Kharwar, who are living in rural Uttar Pradesh in 
Northeastern India. The age of enrolment in primary education varies considerably in this 
location and the children who attend school do this for different lengths of time. This 
natural variation allows us to include in our study children at varying ages with different 




amounts of schooling between the two test administrations, including several groups 
without any schooling. Many selection biases that typically challenge studies that compare 
chronological age and educational age, such as lower dropouts from school amongst boys 
and amongst children at lower socioeconomic strata, were small because all children came 
from the same lowest caste and the socioeconomic status across all villages included in our 
sample is relatively homogeneous. Children were tested twice, with an interval of three 
years. We examine the hypothesized shift in the way children treat new information, by 
way of three hypotheses: (1) Our measures cluster into two modes of representation, 
implicit and explicit representations, and each is associated with different processes of 
change. Whereas implicit representation is more associated with changes through 
differentiation, explicit representation is more associated with changes through 
actualization; (2) as consequence of the operation of these two processes, the strength of 
the cohesion between distinct competencies declines with advanced stages of development; 
(3) educational age and chronological age relate to different components of representation. 
More specifically: (a) Chronological age is more associated with implicit representation, 
whereas educational age is more associated with explicit representation; (b) Chronological 
age is more associated with decreasing increments in cognitive test scores, and educational 




The study was carried out among the Kharwar, a society located around the border 
that divides southeast Uttar Pradesh from western Jharkhand. The sample of the study was 
drawn from nine villages located on a forested plateau south of the Ganges-valley. A few 
years ago, these villages were part of Varanasi district, but now they are part of a newly 
created district called Chandauli. The villages are contained in the Naugarh Block area, 
which is the most remote region of Chandauli district. Situated at a distance of about 100 
km south of the city of Varanasi, the whole region is still quite underdeveloped. The region 
creates harsh conditions for human habitation and the villages are isolated and 
inaccessible. Naugarh is a small market place that caters to the day-to-day needs of villages 




situated at distances between 8 to 25 km. Roads from Naugarh to neighboring villages are 
badly damaged or are absent altogether. Due to this isolation, people have very little 
exposure to the outside world. Animism is the predominant belief system, but Hindu 
rituals and festivals are also observed and celebrated. 
The Kharwar live at a subsistence level of economy by growing rice and gathering 
forest produce, although the latter is in decline because of governmental prohibition on the 
use of forest resources. The villagers have to depend largely on rain-fed crops, because the 
soil has very little water retention capacity and the facilities for irrigation are meager. 
Being so close to the forest, the crops attract wild animals. As a result, the villagers 
generally end up having agricultural produce for only up to three or four months. For the 
rest of the year, they have to depend on forest resources and animals. Food patterns depend 
on the season, brought about by the availability of forest produce and the scarcity of 
agricultural products, such as rice in the months following the monsoon season. People in 
the villages thus also understandably talk about “food months” (when there is food in 
abundance) and “hunger months” (when there is very little food available). Malnutrition is 
common among children. Due to the lack of safe drinking water, diarrhea is an important 
health hazard. 
Among the Kharwar, children are expected and even encouraged to participate in a 
variety of everyday chores and activities. In this way parents foster the comprehension and 
processing of information by children from an early age. For example, within the village 
surroundings children are supposed to be taking care of babies, cleaning of the house, 
running errands, and purchasing little items from local shops. Outside the villages, besides 
collecting firewood and leaves (for making plates), one major activity of children is the 
collection of an indigenous type of nut from the forest. This local nut grows at the heart of 
the leaves of a particular tree, but is only ready to be collected when the leaves have 
colored yellow. Children thus have to learn to be sensitive to the color of the leaves. 
Herding of livestock is another important activity children participate in, initially with 
adults, but later on their own. Even though livestock is the property of individual families, 
they are looked after collectively. Therefore, all children learn to count animals that belong 
to them and those that belong to other families. Since the villages border immediately on 




the forests and fields, children also have first-hand experience of natural surroundings, the 
prevailing weather and the effects of rain and drought. In summary, the community of the 
Kharwar children can be viewed as having a rich variety of cognitive stimulation. 
Education has been introduced fairly recently in this region. Because of a strict 
reliance on agricultural and gathering occupations in this region, there is no demand for 
jobs requiring formal education. Having livestock is a guarantee for milk products, eggs, or 
wool, which can be used for own consumption or for trade. Because being educated did 
not guarantee better living conditions, schools were met with a high degree of skepticism 
at their introduction. During the last decade, however, interest has grown by way of social 
and agricultural developmental work. Moreover, the Indian government provides parents 
and the community with a variety of incentives to send children to school. As a result, 
poverty and status (there is a small variation within those dimensions in the population) are 
not related to the enrollment in and attendance of school. Children can be enrolled into 
school at the start of the school year at any age following their sixth birthday. It is common 
to find children of different ages at the same grade level, which in itself is a great challenge 
for the education of children in a single classroom. 
 
Participants 
One-hundred-and-ninety-one children took part in the study, the youngest being six 
years of age at the first test administration and the oldest being twelve years of age at the 
second test administration that took place after three years. Children were recruited with 
the help of a local NGO. After detailed instructions about the natural characteristics of the 
sample, a collaborator from this NGO traveled to many villages to check for the 
availability of children and compile a list. Parents of children eligible for inclusion in the 
study were consulted and their permission was requested. There was no financial 
compensation offered. Diversity in age of enrollment and availability of unschooled 
children at successive ages enabled a study of the independent effects of chronological and 
educational age. In Table 1 the composition of the sample in terms of chronological age 
and amount of schooling across the three-year interval is presented. 





?umber of Children by Age Cohort and Years of Schooling in between Time Points. 
Age at T2 Years of schooling in between T1 and T2 Total 
 None 1 2 3 4  
9 1 1 10 18 3 33 
10 5 3 10 19 3 40 
11 9 5 20 19 2 55 
12 19 17 9 13 5 63 




Tests from five distinct domains were selected or developed to measure implicit and 
explicit representations. These domains were derived from Carroll’s (1993) structural 
model of human cognitive abilities. This model is based on the re-analysis and integration 
of over 460 data sets found in the factor-analytic literature. In the model, domains of 
reasoning, verbal learning, memory and others are placed at an intermediate level between 
more specific measures and psychometric g. The domains we selected were: Mathematics, 
Spatial Integration, Reasoning, Short Term Memory, and Broad Retrieval. For each 
domain a regular formal test and a more localized test with local stimuli were designed, 
thus making a total of ten tests. Together with a biographical questionnaire, this battery 
was administered twice to all children. 
Implicit representation 
Tests for implicit representation reflect children’s facility in realizing that a series 
of autonomous elements relate to each other in a concrete way. We selected three domains: 
Mathematics, Spatial Integration, and Reasoning. 
Mathematics. Children were asked eighteen mathematical questions. Nine questions 
were asked in school style (e.g., "How much is two plus two?"). The same nine questions 
were also embedded in stories (e.g., "Sawita saw two birds this morning and two this 




afternoon. How many birds did she see today?"). The eighteen test items consisted of six 
additions, six subtractions, and six multiplications. All items were open-ended and scored 
as either correct or incorrect. The eighteen items were summed up into one total score. 
Internal consistency, calculated across all eighteen items was .92 at T1 and .87 at T2. 
Spatial Integration. Two tests were used to measure Spatial Integration. One of 
them consisted of drawings that depicted three pots, eight faces and seventeen birds 
respectively. These were presented to children who were asked to count the number of 
objects in each of drawing. The three items were scored as either correct or incorrect. The 
second test consisted of six search items. The layout of these items involved a large square 
drawn on a paper within which twenty figures from four categories were depicted. The 
figures within a category were only slightly different from each other. Below each square a 
row of four figures, one figure from each category, was shown. After three items a new set 
replaced the first set. The first set consisted of geometric figures such as squares and 
triangles; the second set consisted of concrete figures such as parrots and umbrellas. The 
children had to look up and point at the figures in the square that matched the ones in the 
row beneath the square. The first figure of each set was used as an example, thus making 
six items. The overall Spatial Integration score at each time was obtained by summing up 
the standardized scores of both tests. Internal consistency, calculated across all nine Spatial 
Integration items, was .63 at T1 and .32 at T2. 
Reasoning. Reasoning was measured with two tests. First, inductive reasoning was 
measured with Raven Colored Progressive Matrices. It was chosen here because of its 
appropriateness in cultures for research with participants who are unfamiliar with the more 
abstract format of the Standard Version. The Colored Version includes 36 matrices 
arranged in three sets of twelve matrices in varying level of difficulty. For our purpose, a 
shortened version with two example matrices and eighteen scored matrices was employed. 
The number of items was reduced as the pilot study showed that the administration of 
more than twenty matrices decreased the motivation of the children which carried over to 
later tests. Second, everyday reasoning was measured by four items adapted from 
Sternberg and Kalmar's (1998) set of computerized items that deal with state changes of 
objects. The original items involve objects in particular states and the subjects have to 




predict the future state of that object or postdict its past state by choosing one of the three 
displayed states on a computer screen. The four adapted items used small but concrete 
models of real-life objects familiar to the children in this cultural setting: (1) What will be 
the length of this girl in two years from now? (2) What will be the level of water in this 
bottle in one month from now? (3) What was the color of this yellow leaf three days ago? 
(4) What will be the length of this tree in ten years from now? Children could choose from 
three different alternatives. The overall reasoning score at each time was constructed by 
summing up the standardized scores of both tests. Internal consistency, calculated across 
all 22 reasoning items, was .71 at T1 and .59 at T2. 
Explicit representation 
Tests for explicit representation reflect children’s facility in realizing that a series of 
autonomous objects differ in very concrete ways. We selected two domains: Short Term 
Memory and Broad Retrieval. 
Short Term Memory. The memory test consisted of two sets. In the first set, twelve 
words were read slowly in a random order after which the child was asked to recall the 
words. The words came from four categories of three words each: food, beauty products, 
tools, and animals. The second set followed the same principle, but now with twelve 
concrete objects from the same categories as the words. The objects were taken out 
randomly from a bag and put in front of the child. After the last object was shown the 
objects were covered with a towel and the child was asked to recall the objects. All 
correctly recalled words and objects were scored as “one” and the missing as “zero”. 
Internal consistency, calculated across the two memory items, was .57 at T1 and .45 at T2. 
Broad Retrieval. Two tests were used to measure Broad Retrieval. First, fourteen 
pictures were selected from the locally available child posters to form a localized naming 
test. When an object was named correctly, two points were given; when the response was 
incorrect, but fell in the same category (e.g., naming a melon an orange) one point was 
given; in other cases no points were given. Second, children were asked to enumerate as 
many objects as possible from three different categories: things to eat, animals, and boys’ 
and girls’ names. The number of distinct objects given in each category was summed up to 
a total score. The Broad Retrieval score was constructed by summing up the standardized





Contact and Affluence Factor Loadings of Socioeconomic Family Characteristics. 
  Contact Affluence 
Father's education in years .40  
Amount of land owned -.75 .34 
Months of wage employment .85  
Number of cows owned  .61 
Total size of household .31 .72 
Ownership of radio (Yes/No)  .66 
Eigenvalue 1.54 1.47 
Proportion explained variance .26 .24 
 
 
scores of both tests. Internal consistency, calculated across all fifteen Broad Retrieval 
items, was .33 at T1 and .57 at T2. 
Biographical Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was administered to assess several socioeconomic and family 
characteristics, including the educational level of the parents, the number of siblings, and 
the number of livestock the father owned. An exploratory factor analysis was employed to 
test the dimensionality of the six socioeconomic indicators. Examination of the screeplot 
indicated that a two-factor solution gave the best fit. In Table 2 the factor-loadings of the 
six indicators are shown. The first factor could be understood as “Contact”. Indicators of 
the number of months per year that the father is wage employed and the fathers’ years of 
schooling reflect the amount of contact that the fathers had outside their villages and the 
extent of exposure they had to a different lifestyle, while the amount of land the fathers 
owned would tie them to their villages and hinder outside contact. The second factor could 
be interpreted as “Affluence”. Cows are important indicators of status in the rural area 
where the study took place and together with the size of the household (not just children 




but also the larger family) and ownership of electronic equipment such as a radio reflect 
direct material wealth. 
 
Procedure 
All 191 children were tested twice. The first test administration took place during a 
period of five weeks between November and December 2001. The second test 
administration took place during another five-week period in January and February 2005. 
The tests were administered individually in the following order: Reasoning, Broad 
Retrieval, Spatial Integration, Short Term Memory, and Mathematics. Administration of 
tests to each child took approximately an hour. Children were tested in a secluded area 
(mostly a courtyard) in their village that was especially assigned for the purpose. 
Nevertheless, the testing conditions were often not ideal, since the control on distracting 
noise from other villagers, heat or fierce light was not optimal. Each child was tested on 
both occasions by the same experimenter (one of three). All three experimenters belonged 
to the local community and already had good experience of test administration. All had ten 
years of schooling and worked as primary school teacher in their own village. So, the 
experimenters were well known to the children and their cultural practices. This 
acquaintance may have helped to reduce test anxiety in the participating children. On both 
occasions, the three experimenters received training prior to testing. 
 
Results 
The psychometric properties of the measures are described first. This is followed by 
an examination of intertest covariances using structural equation modeling to determine 
the structural properties of the test battery, both for the performances at T1 and T2 
combined in a single model, followed by a modeling of the differences in performance 
between T1 and T2. Finally, the impact of chronological age and educational age on the 
difference scores between T1 and T2 is examined. This is done in two ways: The 
regression coefficients of the two occasions are examined in a single path analysis while 
the per-year increments of each variable are examined by means of several analyses of 
covariance. 





Unstandardized Means and Standard Deviations per Domain and Year. 




       M SD M SD 
Mathematics  18 9.65 5.19 14.29 3.40 
Spatial Integration  9 6.08 2.04 6.72 1.39 
Reasoning  22 11.54 3.41 15.04 2.66 
Short Term Memory  24 14.17 3.12 16.28 2.60 
Broad Retrieval   76a 48.70 9.71 59.04 7.71 




Table 3 presents the unstandardized means and standard deviations for the five 
tested cognitive domains at the first and second time point. A preliminary analysis 
supported the adequacy of the measures in that all performances were well above chance 
level and, none of the domains showed any ceiling effect, neither at T1, nor at T2. 
Furthermore, we testedwhether sample confounds threatened the design of the study. Table 
4 shows the relevant correlations between the predictor and background variables. No 
serious bias was created by Contact and Affluence. Interestingly, there seems to be an 
interaction between age and gender. Boys enrolled at earlier ages in school, probably 
meaning that parents appear reluctant to send their daughters to school at younger ages. It 
can be concluded that the correlation between age and school attendance at T1 (which was 
already much lower than is typically found in developed countries) disappears altogether at 
T2; yet, there is a small gender bias. 
 
Structural properties 
Two path analyses were employed to test the stability and change in the cohesion of 
the implicit and explicit representations, one to capture the performances at T1 and T2 by a





Correlations among Predictor and Background Variables. 
    Contact Affluence Gender Age at T2 
Schooling at T1 .07 .06 .03 .48** 
Schooling at T2 -.01 .11 .16* .10 
Schooling T2-T1 -.07 .13 .20** -.34** 
Age at T2  .04 -.00 .05  
Gender (Girls = 0; Boys = 1) .07 -.01   
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
 
single model and another to capture the differences in performance between T1 and T2. 
Overall model. We conceptualized a model with Mathematics, Spatial Integration, 
and Reasoning forming a cluster of implicit representation and with Short Term Memory 
and Broad Retrieval forming a cluster of explicit representation. Together, implicit and 
explicit representation make up a dyad, with implicit representation as the more general 
cluster that influences explicit representation. This precedence of implicit representation is 
expected to be stable across T1 and T2. Representation at T1 is expected to predict the 
developmental level at T2. So, we expect a sequence of implicit representation at T1, 
explicit representation at T1, implicit representation at T2, and explicit representation at 
T2, in which earlier constructs influence all later constructs. Paths originating from 
implicit and explicit representations at T1 link to implicit and explicit representations at 
T2. Four paths are modeled: one from implicit at T1 to implicit at T2, one from explicit at 
T1 to explicit at T2, one from implicit at T1 to explicit at T2, and one from explicit at T1 
to implicit at T2. 
Figure 1 shows the best fitting overall model from the path analysis. Performance at 
T1 is shown on the left, with performance at T2 on the right. The model showed a good fit: 
χ2(31, ? = 191) = 46.21, p = .04, CMIN/df = 1.49, AGFI = .92, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .05. 



















Figure 1.Path model of the hierarchical arrangement of the implicit and explicit representation across T1 and T2, standardized solution. 
Labels are affixed 1 for T1 and 2 for T2, MA for Mathematics, SI for Spatial Integration, RE for Reasoning, MS for Memory Span, and BR 
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T1 to implicit at T2, from explicit to T1 to explicit at T2, and from implicit at T1 to 
explicit at T2 were not significant. So, representations atT1 and T2 are only connected 
through the one path from explicit at T1 to implicit at T2. Structurally, performances at T2 
show the same underlying pattern as the performances at T1. Implicit and explicit 
representation hold together very strong at T1, ß = .85, p < .001, and at T2, ß = .73, p < 
.001. Bootstrap analysis showed that these values are well within each other’s confidence 
intervals (.80 to .92 for T1 and .48 to .95 for T2), which indicates that the paths did not 
differ significantly from each other, even though the model fit became somewhat worse 
when both paths were constrained to be equal. Where the cohesion of implicit and explicit 
representation only diminished slightly, the decrease of the cohesion seemed to be more of 
a general pattern, because the factor loadings of the observed scores on the implicit and 
explicit clusters are smaller for T2 than for T1. This best fitting model excludes direct 
arrows between implicit representation at T1 and T2 and between explicit representation at 
T1 and T2. The growth in the implicit representation at T2 is thus not a simple 
strengthening of components that already existed at T1, but appears to reflect the addition 
of newly acquired implicit components that were derived from the explicit representation 
at T1.  
Differences model. A structure similar to the basic model of T1 and T2 was also 
thought to underlie the differences in test scores between T1 and T2. All differences in 
Mathematics, Spatial Integration, and Reasoning formed a single cluster of change in 
implicit representation, labeled differentiation, and all differences in Short Term Memory 
and Broad Retrieval formed a cluster of change in explicit representation, labeled 
actualization. Figure 2 shows the model. This model shows an excellent fit to the data: 
χ2(4, ? = 191) = 6.41, p = .17, CMIN/df = 1.60, AGFI = .95, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .06. All 
coefficients differed significantly from zero (p < .01). The factor loadings range from .38 
to .73, showing that the clusters are well defined. The presence of the two strong clusters 
of growth shows that difference in performance between T1 and T2 are best explained by 
two related mechanisms of development and not by just a single mechanism of 
development. There is a significant path from implicit to explicit representation, ß = .49, p 
< .001, which supports our view that growth in the implicit representation precedes and






















Figure 2. Path model of the two hierarchically arranged latent growth patterns across the 
five observed growth scores (standardized solution). ?otes. Measures labels are affixed 
with ∆ to indicate the growth scores from T1 to T2; MA stands for Mathematics, SI for 
Spatial Integration, RE for Reasoning, MS for Memory Span and BR for Broad Retrieval. 
 
 
contributes to growth in the explicit representation. 
 
Effects of age 
Two statistical methods were employed to examine the impact of chronological and 
educational age. First, a path analysis was used to study how both ages are related with the 









































Figure 3. Path model of the regression of three observed indicators on the hierarchically 
arranged latent growth patterns (standardized solution). ?otes. Measures labels are affixed 
with ∆ to indicate the growth scores from T1 to T2; MA stands for Mathematics, SI for 
Spatial Integration, RE for Reasoning, MS for Memory Span and BR for Broad Retrieval. 
 
 
look more closely at the amounts of development per year of each variable. 
Path analysis. As starting point, the model of Figure 2 was used. Chronological and 
educational age were introduced in this model as predictors of the latent variables, 
differentiation and actualization. The degree of differentiation is expected to decrease with 
chronological age and the degree of actualization is expected to increase with educational 






























gender and amount of schooling in between T1 and T2, as argued before. The estimated 
parameters are presented in Figure 3. The model showed an excellent fit to the data: χ2(18, 
? = 191) = 28.33, p = .06, CMIN/df = 1.57, AGFI = .93, TLI = .93, RMSEA = .06; all 
coefficients differed significantly from zero (p < .01). Visual inspection shows that the 
factor loadings are almost similar to those presented in Figure 2. The same is true for the 
link from differentiation to actualization. The path from chronological age to 
differentiation is significantly negative, ß = -.70. Thus, development slows down with 
chronological age. Gender also affected differentiation negatively, ß = -.22. It appears that 
the development from T1 to T2 seems to slow down faster for boys than it does for girls; 
girls catch up with boys. Educational age had a positive and significant effect on 
actualization, ß = .25. Thus, development of explicit representations speeds up as children 
stay in school for more years. 
Covariance analysis. Table 5 presents the effect sizes to measure change from T1 to 
T2 separately for each cognitive domain and per year of chronological age or educational 
age. For chronological age, the effect sizes were calculated per age cohort by subtracting 
for each cohort the means of T1 from the means of T2 and divide them by their pooled 
standard deviations (Cohen, 1988). For educational age, children with the same amount of 
schooling between T1 and T2 were grouped together. The effect sizes for each group were 
calculated as the means of T2 minus the means of T1, divided by their pooled standard 
deviations. Adjusted means for both ages were generated by analyses of covariance. In the 
first, chronological agewas the grouping variable and educational age the covariate, while 
in the second, educational age was the grouping variable and chronological age the 
covariate. This computation of adjusted means is necessary for confining all differences in 
means to their grouping variable without confounding of the covariate. The results in Table 
5 show a consistent picture. The effect of chronological age was largest in the youngest 
cohort and became gradually smaller in subsequent cohorts, whereas educational age 
revealed the reverse pattern. It can be concluded that both gain analyses pointed in the 
same direction of a decreasing influence of chronological age and an increasing influence 




Effect-Sizes of the Observed Performance Increases by Age Cohort and Years of Schooling, plus the Overall Effect Size (Corrected for 
Sample Dependence). 
  Age Cohort (age at T1)a  Years of Schoolingb  Overall 
  6 7 8 9  1 2 3 4   
Mathematics 1.58 1.30 1.10 0.51  0.63 1.13 1.05 1.01  0.92 
Spatial Integration  1.22 0.81 0.17 -0.08  0.16 0.40 0.48 0.71  0.40 
Reasoning 1.32 0.97 0.84 0.64  0.77 0.59 1.12 1.10  0.87 
Short Term Memory 1.06 0.77 0.54 0.27  0.20 0.43 0.99 1.23  0.58 
Broad Retrieval 1.62 1.20 0.74 0.83  0.53 0.88 1.20 1.10  0.98 
M 1.36 1.01 0.68 0.43  0.46 0.69 0.97 1.03  0.75 
a School cohort effects are eliminated by assigning children at both T1 and T2 the amount of schooling they had in between T1 and T2 and 
by using these values as covariates in a Repeated Measures ANOVA. b Age cohort effects are eliminated by assigning children at both T1 
and T2 the age they had at T2 and using these values as covariates in a Repeated Measures ANOVA. 
 





The findings from the present study reveal the usefulness of disentangling 
chronological and educational age for the study of representational development. We 
conducted a two-wave longitudinal study to examine the interaction between chronological 
and educational age. The research of schooling effects among the Kharwar provided a 
natural experiment to distinguish between the effects of both ages. Children with ages 
ranging from 6 to 9 years at T1 and being either unschooled, drop-out, or attending school, 
were split into groups. Socioeconomic status did not confound the correlation between 
chronological and educational age, which was low in the present study. Tests that 
measured implicit and explicit representation were administered twice with an interval of 
three years. A number of results emerged that would not have been evident by maximizing 
the effects of either chronological age or educational age, as we discuss now. 
There were three results that carry conceptual implications. First, in line with our 
expectations, we found that chronological age is more strongly related to the development 
of implicit representations and educational age is more strongly related to the development 
of explicit representations. Chronological age had a decreasing impact on representational 
development, whereas educational age became more important with increasing education. 
Our analyses of the changes per year supported a similar picture. The effects of 
chronological age suggest a pattern of diminished growth with age in middle childhood. 
So, chronological age is a more important predictor of development for younger children 
than for older children. The reverse pattern was found for educational age; an additional 
year of schooling makes a larger difference for children with more previous schooling. 
This result clearly suggests that the shift from one process of development to another that 
we hypothesized underlies representational development. New input affects children at the 
end of middle childhood differently, than it does very young children. 
Second, confirmatory analyses of the relations between test scores at T1 and among 
test scores at T2 revealed a consistent division of representation in two modes. Our 
analysis of the relations between the differences in tests scores between T1 and T2 showed 
the same division. Change from T1 to T2 is propelled by the increasingly more precise 
differentiation of a specific implicit representation from another implicit representation, 




but also by the increasingly broader actualization of these implicit representations in 
different situations, resulting in the growth of children’s explicit representation. 
Remarkably, we did not observe any evidence for direct relations between the implicit 
representations at T1 and T2 and similarly, between the explicit representations at T1 and 
T2. Our findings are in line with the discussion of accumulation and replacement models 
of development by Kail and Ferrer (2007). Intuitively, one would assume that children 
who display some implicit representation at T1 should still have this exact mode of 
implicit representation at T2. Kail and Ferrer (2007) oppose this view and demonstrate that 
in the development of visual matching children do not swamp incorrect responses with 
correct ones but that incorrect responses are gradually replaced. The absence of direct 
relations from T1 to T2 as well as the shift in development across chronological and 
educational age (Fischer & Paré-Blagoev, 2000; Larivée, Normandeau, & Parent, 2000) 
that we observed in our study seem to be consistent with the replacement model of 
development.  
Third, the comparison of the cohesion between test measures at T1 and the cohesion 
among test measures at T2 showed that the cohesion lessens with age. Domains that make 
up implicit representations and domains that make up explicit representations become 
more separated from each other. This decrease of the cohesion between components of 
representation supports the view that not all development is explained by just a single 
process, typically thought to be differentiation, where development moves from particulars 
to generally more abstract levels of representation (cf. Piaget, 1947/2001), but that 
representational development is also characterized by a shift from abstract to concrete, in 
addition to the familiar shift from concrete to abstract: Representational development in 
school moves from implicit to explicit. Implicit representation at a point in time leads to 
the addition of explicit elements to that exact concept. Later implicit relations may be 
inferred from these explicit representations.  
A problem of the current study was the low reliability of some instruments, both at 
T1 and T2. Source of the low reliability is probably the low number of items for some of 
the instruments; another and possibly more important factor may reside in the less than 
optimal field conditions under which our measures were administered. Although a new 




study would be necessary to get more insight in the background of the low values, we do 
not think that these values jeopardize the conclusions of the current study. First of all, it is 
important to notice that the low reliabilities were not related with floor and ceiling effects. 
In addition, the model fit of all three path models was excellent and the factor loadings of 
the instruments were substantial; so, the low reliability of the items of some instruments 
did not have major repercussions for their intercorrelations or the error components in the 
path analyses. 
A shift from categorization to transfer has critical implications for the 
conceptualization of children’s representational development and more in particular, for 
the ways in which the role of schooling should be understood. Discussions on the effects of 
schooling and culture usually revolve around hypotheses of precisely why transfer from 
one property to a second property is constrained when children do not really know the 
material they work with. Transfer from one property to another involves the inference of 
procedures, representations, and principles from properties and the subsequent application 
of these “attributes” to other properties (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). Schematically this looks 
like the following: property → attribute → property (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). 
Lack of transfer is typically attributed to problems in the inference of appropriate 
attributes. Discussions on the relation between transfer and schooling featured prominently 
in writings by Vygotksy, who claimed that through language or particular sociocultural 
practices children refine their facility to transfer information (Vygotksy, 1978). Research 
has led to two main hypotheses. The first is that schooling and culture improve the ease 
with which children might access constructs and the second is that schooling and culture 
shape the ways by which children use these constructs in everyday life (Norenzayan & 
Heine, 2005; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). The access hypothesis states that only 
through highly specific prompts children may gain access to constructs and that not being 
familiar with those prompts prevents transfer from being possible at all (e.g., Sternberg et 
al., 2002). In contrast, the usage hypothesis claims that, even with full access, there might 
be no transfer because the constructs themselves might change from unschooled to 
schooled child and from one culture to the other (e.g., Olson, 1994).  




The findings of the present study suggest a pattern that deviates from the access and 
the usage hypotheses. Not the inference phase is crucial for transfer, but the prediction 
phase that follows after such inference. We find that schooling affects this phase and not 
inference. More recent research supports this view. Children infer the correct personality 
attributes from properties presented to them, even when they are not able predict other 
properties from those exact attributes (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). Thus, our findings 
are in line with the idea that children are learning to apply to many different settings the 
knowledge they already have. This idea echoes Cole and Bruner’s plea that researchers in 
developmental psychology need to invest time in trying to examine how this shift to 
transfer may be improved, rather than continuing to try and incite new intellectual 
structures in children (Cole & Bruner, 1971). Enhancing children’s explicit representation 
is the route to take, as it provides children with the details of difference and similarity that 
stimulates their future transfer. Schooling provides the best opportunity. 
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Natural Variation of Typicality in Childhood: 




Studies on the role of typicality in transfer and inductive reasoning often confound 
typicality with familiarity. This paper reports an experiment on the interaction of 
familiarity and typicality. A total of 59 Turkish-Dutch and 58 Dutch primary school 
children (mean age = 11.09 years) completed a 96-item series of visual search tasks, 
in which they had to see whether a target that was presented to them first, was 
present in a subsequently presented set of stimuli. Familiarity was manipulated by 
using both Turkish and Dutch items and typicality was manipulated by varying the 
salience of the difference between the target and its distractors. Main effects of both 
familiarity and typicality were not significant, but their interaction was. Low 
familiarity led to an advantage in the processing of features, a high familiarity to an 
advantage in the processing of ideals. This effect disappeared when the number of 
distractors became larger. It is concluded that effects of typicality are restricted to 
familiar perceptual content. 
 
 
Most children and adults would consider a book a better example of things that can be read 
than a TV guide or a drug prescription, but for many other categories the most typical 
example could be different for people of different ages, different cultural backgrounds, or 
even for one person in different situations (Barsalou, 1985; Heit & Hahn, 2001; Medin, 
Ross, Atran, Cox, Coley, Proffitt, & Blok, 2005). Variation in the most representative 




member of a category is so widespread that many researchers in the field now claim some 
form of specificity. The precise nature of such a specificity has been examined extensively 
over the last few decades (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996, 2002; Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kemler 
Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 2000; Matan & Carey, 2001; Simons & Keil 1995), 
but the focus in these studies is often on showing that typicality is an important feature of 
information processing and not on showing the situational changes in what is typical and 
what not. In the present study we aim to develop a better understanding of the conditions 
in which typicality might be found. To this end we aim to disentangle typicality from 
familiarity and task complexity. Stimulus content is varied by selecting pictorial stimuli 
from Turkish as well as Dutch cultural backgrounds. Exposing Turkish-Dutch bicultural 
children and Dutch monocultural children to these same stimuli in a visual search task 
leads to a natural variation in typicality. 
To understand typicality, researchers have investigated the defining properties of 
categories (Barsalou, 1985; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990). One way by 
which people tend to define categories is by means of central tendency. Another is by 
means of ideals. Central tendency is a purely cognitive metric of the degree of resemblance 
between all members that belong to the category. Members that have the most features in 
common with other members are central to the category, while those members with fewer 
features in common are less central. The most central members are also the most typical. 
Ideals relate to the goals people have. One could think of a causal sequence that goes from 
the cause of a category to the goal that people derive from that one cause and eventually to 
the ideal that people associate with their goals (Barsalou, 1985). For food, such a cause 
might be the preparation of an evening meal, with the added goal to lose weight. One ideal 
for this cause would thus be food items with only a very few calories. For other goals, 
other ideals might be held, even with a same cause.  
Variability in what is typical is an important aspect of the idea of typicality. Ample 
evidence of the variability of information processing may be gathered from developmental 
(Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004) and cross-cultural studies (Bailenson, 
Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002; Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997; Medin, Coley, Storms, 
& Hays, 2003; Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). Microgenetic studies have been 




particular effective in showing the within-individual variability of information processing 
(Siegler, 1994, 2000). Children and adults vary in how they solve related problems, in how 
they solve the same problem twice, and even in how they solve the same problem within a 
single trail. For example, Tunteler, Pronk, and Resing (2008) showed two distinct training 
effects that helped to improve analogical performance in six-year old children, above and 
beyond a practice effect. Although the specific reasons for this high variability are unclear, 
research suggests that stimulus familiarity and perceived task complexity contribute to this 
variability (Heit & Hahn, 2001; Kittur, Holyoak, & Hummel, 2006). 
To describe familiarity and complexity as two possible preconditions that might 
promote or inhibit the differentiation of ideals and features, a connectionist modeling 
approach is chosen. Connectionist models were originally developed to explain the 
increasingly higher speed with which children’s vocabulary size develops (Elman, Bates, 
Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, & Plunkett, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Marcus, 
1998, 2001; Van Geert, 1991). Separate words or other units of knowledge in people’s 
mental representation connect with other words or units so as to build up an extensive 
network. In such models the differentiation between ideals and features is brought about by 
the amount of connections in a network. In richer networks, discrete units of information 
share more features with other units. As a consequence, the relevance of features becomes 
smaller with increasing familiarity; relevance shifts to the meaning that is shared between 
the single elements in one’s representation, ideals (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). However, this does not have to mean that for familiar stimuli the ideals are 
always accessed. Even when stimuli are familiar, having to discriminate a particular target 
from its distractors might require people to access features instead of ideals (cf. Sperber, 
Cara, & Girotto, 1995). When many distractors are present, the need to attend to many 
different elements within the network at the same time is vital for success and accessing 
the network by way of ideals might become counterproductive (Anderson & Lebiere, 
2003; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998).  
Frame switching between the ethnic and mainstream cultural frames by bicultural 
individuals is a process where situation specific change from ideals to features and back is 
striking (Benet-Martinez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002). 




Cultural frame switching is a process in which everyday validity and need for transfer 
coincide. Today many people identify with more than one culture (Berry& Sam, 1996), 
often their own ‘home’ culture, the culture from where their family originates, and their 
‘host’ culture, the culture to which they immigrated and continue to live. In their cognitive 
representation bicultural persons capture cultural knowledge for both the cultures they 
identify with. Cultural frame switching is a process in which biculturals have to change 
from one cultural meaning system to the other in response to changing situational demands 
(Benet-Martinez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002).  
Data were collected amongst both bicultural and monocultural children in The 
Netherlands. The first wave of immigrants to The Netherlands in the 1960s was formed by 
migrant workers from the Mediterranean and the former Dutch colonies. At present, 17% 
of the population is of foreign origin. This figure includes people not born in the 
Netherlands, as well as those born in the Netherlands with at least one nonnative parent. It 
is estimated that in 2010, almost half of the population of the three largest cities will 
consist of migrants (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003). Turkish-Dutch biculturals 
constitute the largest immigrant group in The Netherlands and they are perceived as the 
most prototypical of all migrant groups by Dutch monoculturals (Pettigrew, 1998). For this 
reason, in the present study biculturals were exclusively limited to Turkish-Dutch 
bicultural children.  
The aim of the present study is to gain insight in the different factors that contribute 
to the ease with which bicultural and monocultural children might distinguish subtle 
differences in members of the same category of either Dutch or Turkish stimuli. We 
examined the two-way interaction of typicality and familiarity in four hypotheses: (1) 
When the content included in the search items is less familiar, bicultural as well as 
monocultural children process features faster than they process ideals. (2) When item 
content is familiar, children process ideals faster than features. (3) The interaction of 
typicality and familiarity is the most salient for the smallest number of distractors and 
gradually declines when the number of distractors increases. (4) Typicality is item specific 
and not the consequence of fixed cultural frames. So, for biculturals, processing ideals or 
features is not related to their level of adaption to Dutch society. 






A sample of 117 primary school children in The Netherlands, ranging in age from 8 
to 13 years, took part in the study. Of this total, 59 were of Turkish-Dutch origin (26 boys 
and 33 girls; mean age is 11.24 years), with 58 of Dutch origin (31 boys and 27 girls; mean 
age is 10.92 years). Children were recruited in their school. Prior to the data collection, the 
school boards and all parents with children in grades 6, 7, and 8 were asked written 
consent. Of the 59 Turkish-Dutch children, 46 had parents who were both born in Turkey 
and 13 had one parent who was born in Turkey. All Turkish-Dutch children except three 
were born in The Netherlands. The majority of Turkish-Dutch in our sample went to 
school at an Islamic school in Rotterdam, while a few other Turkish-Dutch children went 
to school at two mixed schools in the south of The Netherlands. The Dutch children went 
to several schools in the south of The Netherlands. 
 
Instruments 
Two tests of visual search, one Turkish and one Dutch, were designed to measure 
response time in telling apart similar items from one category, at two levels of abstraction, 
features and ideals. The reason for using both Turkish and Dutch items was to manipulate 
familiarity. The two visual search tests were designed following examples from the visual 
search literature (Geisler & Chou, 1995; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). In addition, a single 
questionnaire that addressed socioeconomic status as well as acculturative behavior, was 
administered to all 117 children.  
Visual search. Children had to complete two 48-item series in which they had to 
judge whether the target that was presented to them first could be located among a 
subsequent set of distractors. Decision time was taken as the measure of children’s 
performance. Items were generated by using five item rules: cultural origins of the target (2 
levels), domains (4 levels), typicality (2 levels), presence or absence of the target amongst 
the distractors (2 levels), and finally the number of distractors (3 levels). This results in 96 
items. An initial pool of Dutch and Turkish pictorial stimuli was assembled by way of a 
web based search. A panel of Turkish, Dutch and Turkish-Dutch experts rated the cultural 




typicality of these targets, which led to the identification of specifically Dutch and 
specifically Turkish target stimuli in four categories: famous persons (e.g., Sinterklaas and 
Ataturk), delicacies (e.g., Dutch rusk with sprinkles and Turkish baklava), kitchenware 
(e.g., Dutch cheese slicer and Turkish cezve), and national flags. For each of these targets 
two times seven distractors were either selected from the initial pool of stimuli or created 
by using photo editing software. The first seven distractors concerned features and 
consisted of minor, purely perceptual variations in appearance: changes in the color, size, 
orientation, or shape for some part of every target. The latter seven distractors concerned 
ideals and consisted of relational variations in meaning: other members from the same 
higher order categories. Items were grouped in two 48-item blocks of Dutch and Turkish 
items. The sequence of the blocks was randomized across children and the items in each 
block were randomized as well. Internal consistency (based on the decision times) for the 
48 Dutch items was .90 for the Dutch children and .93 for Turkish-Dutch children, and for 
the 48 Turkish items .92 for the Dutch children and .91 for Turkish-Dutch children. For all 
96 items the internal consistency was .95 for both groups. 
Questionnaire. All 117 children completed a questionnaire that concerned their key 
demographics. In addition, all Turkish-Dutch children were also asked 21 questions about 
their acculturation behavior. Five questions concerned their use of language, four questions 
concerned social behavior, and twelve final questions concerned the frequency with which 
they were involved in specifically Turkish and Dutch activities.  
The items of the questionnaire were clustered with a factor-analysis. Demographic 
variables were analyzed separately from the acculturation variables as only these five 
demographic variables were administered to all 117 children. The result was a cluster for 
mothers’ socioeconomic status and a cluster for fathers’ socioeconomic status, explaining 
57.98 and 31.74 percent of all variance, respectively. These two factors were subjected to 
one hierarchical factor analysis that explained 56.41 percent of the variance.  
The 21 acculturation items administered to the Turkish-Dutch children only were 
also taken together in a single analysis. This led to four clusters: private adoption, private 
maintenance, public adoption and public maintenance, explaining 14.83, 14.16, 8.45, and 
7.42 percent of the variance. These four clusters were again subjected to one hierarchical 




factor analysis that explained 29.98 percent of the variance. Adoption in the private (.31) 
and public (.75) domains loaded positively on this one factor, whereas maintenance in the 
private (-.69) and public (-.26) domains loaded negatively on this factor. Following 
Kagitcibasi (2005), this pattern is interpreted as autonomy orientation. 
 
Procedure 
The testing language was Dutch. The tests were individually administered in a quiet 
and isolated office or class room. The administration took about 30 minutes. All children 
completed first the search items and then the questionnaire. 
The instruments were administered in a standardized manner. First, children were 
seated behind a table with a notebook that had a 15.4 inch flat screen. Second, all targets 
were presented one by one on the screen in sizes up to 4 by 4 inch and children were asked 
whether they thought each target was typically Turkish or typically Dutch. Third, children 
carried out a trial item together with the test leader and this trial was repeated until the 
child understood the procedure of each item: (a) the presentation of a focal point at the 
centre of the screen for 1000 ms; (b) a presentation of the target, on the exact same 
location as the focal point first was seen, for 1200 ms; (c) a short interspersion of an empty 
black screen for 850 ms; (d) the appearance of a 3 by 3 matrix with three, five or seven 
images simultaneously on the screen, one of which could be the previously presented 
target. Each child received the instruction to decide as fast as possible whether the target 
was present or absent and respond accordingly. Responses were recorded by means of a 
response box that was specifically designed for our purposes. The box contains a touch pad 
as home button and two response buttons, ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Children respond by lifting their 
finger from the home button (which they had kept there throughout the item sequence) and 
press “yes” or “no”. When children lift the finger from the home button, the screen 
immediately turns black and decision time is recorded as the time between the onset of the 
search matrix and their lifting of their finger from the home button. When children press 
either response button movement time is recorded as the time between the lifting of the 
finger from the home button and the pressing of the respective response button. When an 
item was completed, the next item started again by pressing the home button. Children 




could pause at any point in between two items and resume when they are ready by placing 




The psychometric properties of the cognitive dimensions are described first. This is 
followed by an examination of the within-subject effects of familiarity and typicality, both 
with number of distractors as an additional factor in a single analysis and separately for 2, 
4, and 6 distractors. Finally, effects of culture are examined by exploring the between-
subject effects of culture and the correlations of autonomy with familiarity and typicality 
for the Turkish-Dutch children. 
 
Psychometric properties 
Table 1 shows the unstandardized means and standard deviations for the response 
times of the total number of items and also for the number correct for ideals, features, 
Turkish and Dutch items, separately for Turkish-Dutch children and Dutch children. 
Visual inspection leads to the observation that Dutch children respond a little bit faster 
than Turkish-Dutch children on all four dimensions. Critical is the observation that 
children scored about half correct for ideals, features, Turkish items, and Dutch items, 
which is close to chance level. In order to verify whether this pattern reflects a 
performance at chance level or hides a more complex pattern of effects, a 2 (Turkish items 
or Dutch items) × 4 (famous persons, delicacies, kitchenware, or national flags) × 2 (ideals 
or features) × 2 (presence or absence of the target) × 3 (2, 4, or 6 distractors) repeated 
measures analysis of covariance for correctness at item-level was carried out, with culture 
as between-subject factor and children’s socioeconomic status as a covariate so as to 
reduce bias in the socioeconomic status of Dutch and Turkish-Dutch children. Significant 
were the main effect of presence or absence of the target and the interaction between 
typicality and the presence or absence of the target, F(1, 107) = 8.95, p < .01, partial eta-
squared = .08, and F(1, 107) = 4.01, p < .05, partial eta-squared = .04, respectively. When 
the target is present children score more correct (M = 6.13 out of 12) than when the target





Overall raw means and standard deviations for response time and number correct, per 
culture. 
  Turkish-Dutch children Dutch children 
  M SD M SD 
Decision time     
  Ideals 1759 388 1647 367 
  Features 1739 401 1618 362 
  Turkish 1721 404 1649 409 
  Dutch 1778 428 1615 352 
Number correct     
  Ideals 24.35 3.42 23.74 3.35 
  Features 24.22 3.40 23.24 3.26 
  Turkish 24.05 3.74 22.71 3.11 
  Dutch 24.53 3.49 24.28 3.10 
 
 
is absent (M = 5.84 out of 12). This effect is strongest for ideals (M = 6.29 for presence; M 
= 5.76 for absent) than for features (M = 5.96 for presence; M = 5.93 for absent). The main 
effect of culture was not significant F(1, 107) = 1.58, p = .21, partial eta-squared = .02. It 
turns out that children in our sample did not process the 96 items at random. Differences in 
processing are now analyzed in more detail by looking at the decision times. 
 
Within-subject effects 
The effects of typicality and familiarity were tested in a 3 (2, 4, or 6 distractors) × 2 
(Turkish or Dutch items) × 2 (ideals or features) repeated measures analysis of covariance, 
with culture as between-subject factor and children’s family socioeconomic status as a 
covariate, as it might (but necessarily so) reduce bias in the socioeconomic status of Dutch





Estimated Marginal Means (in ms) and Standard Errors for the Effect of Origin by 
Typicality per Culture.* 
    Turkish items Dutch items 
    M SE M SE 
Correct items Ideals 1748 39 1728 44 
 Features 1725 39 1757 44 
2 Distractors Ideals 1842 61 1745 54 
 Features 1655 50 1813 58 
4 Distractors Ideals 1720 44 1716 54 
 Features 1721 46 1702 52 
6 Distractors Ideals 1759 56 1723 56 
  Features 1680 56 1757 56 
* All scores are corrected for socioeconomic status. M = mean. SE = standard error. 
 
 
and Turkish-Dutch children. Main effects of familiarity and typicality were not significant, 
F(1, 107) = 0.12, p = .73, partial eta-squared = .00, and F(1, 107) = 0.14, p = .91, partial 
eta-squared = .00, respectively. The effect of the number of distractors was also not 
significant, F(2, 106) = 1.25, p = .29, partial eta-squared = .01. In contrast, the interaction 
of origin with typicality was significant, F(1, 107) = 4.16, p < .05, partial eta-squared = 
.04. Table 2 presents the estimated marginal means of the interaction of origin with 
typicality. For Turkish items features are processed faster than ideals. For Dutch items the 
ideals are processed faster than the features. This confirms our first two hypotheses. 
The interaction of familiarity with typicality was also explored separately for 
number of distractors as the three-way interaction of number of distractors, familiarity, and 
typicality in this main analysis was small but still significant, F(2, 106) = 3.31, p < .05, 
partial eta-squared = .03. The interaction of familiarity with typicality was highly 




significant when 2 distractors were presented, F(1, 107) = 9.31, p < .01, partial eta-squared 
= .08. This effect was not present with 4 and 6 distractors, F(1, 107) = 0.12, p = .73, partial 
eta-squared = .00, and F(1, 107) = 2.07, p = .15, partial eta-squared = .02, respectively. 
This confirms our third hypothesis, which stated that the effect of typicality disappears 
when processing becomes more effortful. 
 
Cultural effects 
No main effects of culture reached significance in our sample, indicating there were 
no differences in decision time (DT) between Turkish-Dutch and Dutch children. Not one 
interaction between culture and familiarity was significant. The only significant interaction 
of culture was with typicality and only with 4 distractors, F(1, 107) = 4.00, p < .05, partial 
eta-squared = .04. Turkish-Dutch children were faster with features (DT = 1734 ms) than 
with ideals (DT = 1822 ms), whereas Dutch children were faster with ideals (DT = 1614 
ms) than with features (DT = 1689 ms). It is not clear why this effect is only present for 4 
distractors and not for 2 or 6 distractors. 
Correlations between the autonomy orientation of children’s family and the 
differences in decision time between ideals and features were also examined, for Turkish-
Dutch children only, separately for number of distractors. With 2 distractors, correlations 
between autonomy and differences in DT between ideals and features are not significant 
for Turkish and Dutch items, r(51) = .18, p = .20, and r(51) = .18, p = .22, respectively. 
With 4 distractors, these two correlations are even smaller, r(51) = -.05, p = .73, and r(51) 
= -.01, p = .94, respectively. In contrast, with 6 distractors both of these correlations 
become significant, r(51) = .40, p < .01 and r(51) = .38, p < .01, respectively. The relations 
between culture, acculturation, and performance on these visual search tasks are not 
consistent. Results with regard to the fourth hypothesis are inconclusive. 
 
Discussion 
Aim of the present study was to develop a more informed idea of the conditions in 
which effects of typicality arise. In order to achieve this aim we attempted to disentangle 
typicality from familiarity and task complexity. We conducted an experiment of response 




time in visual search amongst monocultural and bicultural children in the Netherlands to 
examine the interaction of familiarity and typicality. Involving both monocultural and 
bicultural children allowed us to manipulate familiarity independently of typicality, while 
remaining close to the everyday experience of children: We used naturally occurring 
stimuli instead of nonsense stimuli, which are so often used in experiments of transfer and 
inductive reasoning. A number of results emerged that would not have been evident when 
looking at typicality alone, as we discuss now. 
There were three results that have conceptual implications. First, while familiarity 
and typicality do not have significant main effects, their interaction is significant. Dutch 
monocultural as well as Turkish-Dutch bicultural children process features faster than 
ideals for unfamiliar items; however, we find the opposite for familiar items: Dutch 
monocultural as well as Turkish-Dutch bicultural children process ideals faster than 
features. This finding implies that the independent manipulation of typicality and 
familiarity in our experiment was not matched by a similar independence in the responses; 
typicality and familiarity are dependent. Our results suggest that typicality only becomes 
important with familiar items. The dependence of typicality on familiarity may explain 
why these two features were often confounded in previous studies. 
Second, the size of the interaction between familiarity and typicality depends on the 
number of distractors. The interaction between familiarity and typicality is largest in items 
with two distractors, but is nearly absent in items with four and six distractors. This finding 
questions the automatic access of either ideals or either features. Instead, our results 
suggest that also when perceiving familiar stimuli, the need to discriminate a particular 
target from its distractors requires the access of features and that the access of ideals might 
actually impede success. The distinction in ways in which features and ideals are processed 
loses much of its relevance in everyday perception, because common perceptual tasks 
often require both types of processing. 
Third, this observed interaction between familiarity and typicality is not 
systematically related to children’s cultural membership or Turkish-Dutch children’s 
acculturative status. Cultural membership did affect visual search only at one complexity 
level; acculturative status had an influence on another complexity level. It can be 




concluded that processing in the present study is not guided by cultural frames. The 
Turkish stimuli might have been insufficiently unfamiliar to both Dutch and Turkish-
Dutch children to make the subtle discriminations required in the present study. Culture 
might contribute more when the cultural distance between the two groups would have been 
larger and when the stimuli used would have tapped into more culture-specific knowledge. 
Future research should explore this specificity issue in more detail. 
The generalizability of the present findings requires some closer examination. The 
average performance level of the children was relatively low. It could well be that stronger 
interactions between familiarity and typicality and indeed main effects of familiarity and 
typicality would be found when the perceptual tasks would be simpler. Nevertheless, the 
present data did show high alpha levels for decision times of the Turkish and Dutch scales 
and on top of this a significant interaction between typicality and familiarity. Moreover, 
analyses not reported here revealed that incorrect items showed the same patterns of effects 
as correct items (i.e., an interaction of familiarity and typicality). Future studies should see 
whether the interaction of familiarity and typicality is also found for simpler tasks. Effects 
of acculturation might be more pronounced for simpler stimuli. 
Another generalization issue involves the choice of content domains. In the present 
study we looked at content that might be considered cultural artifacts: famous persons, 
delicacies, kitchenware and national flags (Bloom, 1996). The domain of artifacts is 
typically contrasted with the domain of living kinds and the domain of behavior (Gelman, 
2003; Keil, 2003). Typicality in the domain of living kinds is strong (Atran, 1998) and 
young children recognize that artifacts are fundamentally different from living kinds 
(Jipson & Geman, 2007). Thus, the interaction between typicality and familiarity we find 
in this present study may not generalize to domains like living kinds or theory of mind. 
Nevertheless, artifacts are a domain that children meet frequently in their everyday lives 
and our findings are likely to generalize to much of children’s everyday experience.  
A final generalization issue refers to the nature of the visual search task employed 
in the present study. Our tasks present children with conflicting images in the search 
matrix that are intended to distract from the targets. The use of distractors in the present 
study deviates from the typical practice. Studies of transfer use the same task format to 




measure typicality in transfer, with minimal variations. For example, “Trout are a type of 
fish: All trouts have heglal inside:: Do all fish have heglal inside?” Items such as these 
vary the extent to which the premise category is typical of the conclusion category, in the 
above example thus how typical trout is of fish. It might be that some people find that 
salmon is more typical of fish, or tuna is, and this may influence the inferences people 
make. Nevertheless, the present study employed a task that omits the inference phase in 
property to property transfer and still observed that an effect of typicality remains firmly 
present. 
The interaction of familiarity and typicality in this research has critical implications 
for the conceptualization of age-related and cross-cultural differences in the categorization 
of artifacts. Often researchers argue for a high specificity of ideals and features, across age 
as well as culture. This specificity is typically attributed to the inference phase of transfer. 
Transfer from one property to another, involves the inference of a attribute from the first 
property and the subsequent application of the attributes to other properties (Barnett & 
Ceci, 2002). Schematically this resembles a fixed sequence: property → attribute → 
property (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). Our findings also raise the issue of how 
transfer in childhood may be improved. In Brouwers, Mishra, and Van de Vijver (2008), 
we follow Cole and Bruner (1971) by arguing that researchers need to invest their time by 
trying to determine how transfer may be improved, rather than continuing to try and incite 
intellectual structures in children. In the present study we find that familiarity with relevant 
everyday properties affects the processing of information in a positive way. The causes of 
high variability in such familiarity require further investigation. 
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The shared aim of the four studies in this dissertation was to develop a more 
informed understanding of the link between culture and cognition. Context specificity is an 
important element of cognitive transfer, but how specificity actually transpires is subject of 
much discussion. Aim of the present dissertation was to find support for the hypothesis 
that success and failure of transfer should be attributed to children’s mental representation 
In order to achieve this aim I conducted studies at the four lower levels of Cole’s (1996) 
model of the distribution of cognition in time: the history of human beings on earth 
(cultural-historical time), the history of the individual’s immediate context (ontogeny of 
the outside), life of the individual himself or herself (ontogeny), and the history of 
moment-to-moment lived experience (microgenesis). A number of results would not have 
been evident when examining specific aspects of cognitive functioning in isolation, as we 
discuss now. 
Each of the four studies yielded results with conceptual implications. First, our 
analysis of cognitive functioning from a cultural-historical perspective found three 
important factors to be independently associated with an increase in Raven scores: 
educational permeation, educational age, and publication year. Two of these factors, 
educational permeation and educational age, will often act in concert; economic growth 
over an extended period of time will usually lead to more educational permeation and to an 
increase of the average educational age of a population. If the Flynn effect is observed in a 
country with a substantial economic development in the period we studied, the size of the 
Flynn effect seems to be boosted by the economic development. Raven scores should thus 
not be interpreted from just an individual-level perspective. We found that test and country 
characteristics are also important. The Raven’s test, as many other tests, may contain 
elements that show differential suitability across cultures (Van de Vijver, 1997). Our 






The nature of the Flynn effect has attracted several different interpretations. Central 
issue in these interpretations is often whether the rise in Raven performance reflects an 
actual rise in intelligence or whether other factors also play a role. Some of the factors that 
are suggested are improved nutrition, quality of schooling, and smaller families (Flynn, 
2007). What these interpretations have in common is that they are rather distal to the actual 
changes that take place in children’s or adult’s cognitive processing. This questions the 
applicability of many of the large analyses to explain the mechanisms underneath the 
Flynn effect. Small scale studies that are more proximal to the true cognitive 
transformations will be necessary to shed light on the mechanisms that produce the change 
that is observed. 
Second, an analysis of cognitive functioning from an ontogenetic between-child 
perspective among schooled and unschooled Kharwar children in India found a superior 
test performance of school-attending children in six-year olds. However, this higher 
performance of school-attending children should not be taken to imply that they think in a 
way that is qualitatively different from the way in which unschooled children tend to think. 
Standardization on either chronological age or educational age yielded similar factor 
structures, suggesting that there are no major qualitative differences between school-
attending and unschooled children in cognitive functioning in our sample. Using a design 
that allowed for a direct comparison of educational age and chronological age, we found 
that school attendance has a substantially smaller impact on children’s competence than 
natural stimulation provided by everyday life. On average, the increase caused by one year 
of chronological age is twice the increase caused by one year of schooling. Moreover, 
schooling effects on tests of cognitive ability are confined to those cognitive domains that 
are somewhat removed from basic operativity and that primarily benefit from the 
knowledge of factual details (Ceci, 1990). However, the generalizability of the present 
findings requires closer examination, as the overall quality of the schools in our study was 
rather poor. It could well be that a higher quality in the schools might have induced 
stronger school effects (Fuller & Clark, 1994). 
Third, our analysis of cognitive developmental processes from an ontogenetic 
within-child perspective among the same schooled and unschooled Kharwar children in 




India as in the second study saw that chronological age had a decreasing impact on 
representational development when children became older and that educational age 
became more important with increasing amounts of schooling. Thus, chronological age is a 
more important predictor of development for younger children than for older children. The 
reverse pattern was found for educational age; an additional year of schooling makes a 
larger difference for children with more previous schooling. New input affects children at 
the end of middle childhood differently, than it does very young children. This changing 
pattern of the relevance of developmental processes is reflected in a consistent division of 
representation into two modes. Cognitive change in primary school age is propelled by the 
increasingly precise differentiation of specific implicit representation from other implicit 
representations, but also by the increasingly broader actualization of the implicit 
representations to different situations, thus resulting in the growth of children’s explicit 
representation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).  
Fourth, the analysis of cognitive functioning from a microgenetic within-child 
perspective among Dutch monocultural and Turkish-Dutch bicultural children found a 
significant interaction of familiarity and typicality, while their main effects were not 
significant. Dutch monocultural as well as Turkish-Dutch bicultural children process 
features faster than ideals for unfamiliar items. However, we found the opposite for 
familiar items: Dutch monocultural as well as Turkish-Dutch bicultural children process 
ideals faster than features. Such a finding implies that the independent manipulation of 
typicality and familiarity was not reflected in an independence of the responses; typicality 
and familiarity are dependent. Our results show that typicality only becomes important 
with familiar items. The dependence of typicality on familiarity can explain why these two 
facets are often confounded in earlier studies. In addition, the size of the interaction 
between familiarity and typicality depends on the number of distractors. The interaction 
between familiarity and typicality is largest in items with just two distractors, but nearly 
absent in items with four and six distractors. These findings question the automatic access 
of either ideals or either features (Heit & Hahn, 2001). Instead, our findings suggest that 
when perceiving familiar stimuli typicality may arise when there is not a need to 





Differences in how mental representation affects performance are manifest in all 
four studies. A Flynn effect is the result of schooling and a richer context passing on more 
information and stimulation to mental representations. Variation in the size of the country 
specific Flynn effects may then be attributed to the degree to which representations of their 
citizens are enriched over successive generations. The difference between chronological 
and educational age can be explained by a sharp conceptual distinction between the degree 
to which a domain in a mental representations is differentiated from other domains and 
how rich that one domain is. Children that attend school may perform better than children 
who do not attend school, but this only reflects the richness of particular domains in their 
mental representations and not the existence of domains as such. This is in line with a 
decrease in the effect of chronological age, which reveals that domains reach a maximum 
in their differentiation, and an increase in the true effect of educational age, which reveals 
that new input is more readily accepted into the network when the network is already 
richer. The distinction between ideals and features derives from their familiarity and again 
shows the central role of mental representation.  
Dynamic variation at the four scales of distribution of cognition that were examined 
in my dissertation (the variation in the size of the Flynn effect across countries with 
differences in affluence; unique effects of chronological and educational age; distinct 
patterns of change across chronological age and educational age; and the conditionality of 
typicality) has implications for the conceptualization of culture and cognition. The findings 
support the hypothesis that the differences in cognitive functioning between children and 
adults from different cultures are best explained by differences in mental representation. In 
richer representations, discrete units of information share more features with other units, 
thus familiarity with relevant everyday properties affects the processing of information in a 
positive way.  
 
Representation and transfer  
One implication that follows from the finding that mental representation explains 
developmental change and cross-cultural differences is that human information processing 
is neither domain nor situation-specific, but something that we might call representation-




specific. The implication is that knowledge may be mentally transferred from one domain 
to the other and from one situation to the other, when the actor explicitly represents the 
conditions of each domain or each situation and is able to connect the different conditions 
to one another. In other words: Context itself should be mentally represented in order for 
cognitive transfer to transpire. The central position of mental representation in information 
processing does not discard the autonomy of both domains (Gelman, 2003) and situations 
(Barsalou, 1985; Shore, 1996), but does suggest that domains may associate with other 
domains and that situations may associate with other situations, depending on the specific 
unit of information in the actor’s mental representation that is accessed. 
At first sight the psychological literature appears reluctant to accept the idea that 
autonomous domains may associate on occasion and that the same is true for autonomous 
situations, but a closer examination of the literature reveals that the idea of representation 
directed association is not outside the accepted breadth of information processing. Rather 
than being reluctant to accept that different domains and situations may associate, it seems 
that domain-specificity is often addressed in different areas of the literature than situation-
specificity and that their mutual relevance tends to go unnoticed. On the one hand, the 
literature appears to be divided on how mental representation is thought to be connected to 
reality. In the representation of a math problem or a game such as the Tower of Hanoi the 
connection with reality is thought to be strong (Newell & Simon, 1972), while in the use of 
heuristics the connection is thought to be weak (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research 
Group, 1999). On the other hand, the literature appears to be divided on how cohesive the 
elements of mental representations are. In representations such as crystallized intelligence 
(Mackintosh, 1998) and grammar (Pinker, 1994) the constituent elements are thought to be 
highly cohesive, while in preconceptions about how the social biological, and physical 
worlds work (cf. Richerson & Boyd, 2005) constituent elements are thought to be not very 
cohesive. 
In order to examine this discussion in more detail I juxtapose the two dimensions to 
create four different perspectives, as shown in Figure 1. The four poles resemble high 
cohesion (molar), no cohesion (molecular), a connection that is dictated by reality, and a 
















Figure 1. Model that captures two axes that relate four major conceptual frameworks in 
psychology that deal with mental representation. 
 
 
cognitive representation is an incomplete reflection of a particular event, entity, and 
operation that gradually develops to become more abstract, while becoming more detached 
of its constituent details. A recent empirical example espousing this view is given by 
Siegler (1999). The author has demonstrated that children’s mathematical skills develop 
through the discovery of new processing strategies, in addition to the continuously 
changing frequency with which the they use familiar strategies and. Every new strategy is 
an extension and simplification of previous strategies and fits precisely among the ones 
learned earlier, because all relations amongst features are dictated by the fundamental 
nature of things and representations follow those relations. 
Many theorists now see that children and adults exhibit much more variation in 
their cognitive functioning than classic theories such as those by Piaget (1947/2001) can 
explain and for this reason have started to formulate newer frameworks. These attempts 
tend to take two directions and are found in cells two and three. Cell two captures the idea 
that representations will eventually make up a large system, but contends that cohesion 













natural relations among features. A recent empirical example espousing this view is given 
by Benet-Martinez, Lee, and Leu (2006). These authors have shown that Chinese 
immigrants in the USA develop separate Chinese and American representations and that 
they switch between the two when necessary. Only valued features are internalized into the 
representation and others are not. This would imply that representations gradually become 
unique to one situation, but that they extend across all possible content domains. The fully 
opposite view is gathered from the third cell, thus that any representation draws from one 
domain at a time, but that they extend across all possible situations. Here, domains reflect 
specialized capacity spheres, each with a characteristic set of operations and processes. In 
this view representations thus mirror the natural relations among features in reality, but do 
not build into one large system. A recent empirical example espousing this view is given 
by Demetriou, Kui, Spanoudis, Christou, Kyriakides, and Platsidou (2005). These authors 
demonstrate that differences between Chinese and Greek children in arithmetical skills are 
not superficial, but extend from simple strategies to fundamental memory processes, 
differences that for these children are not found for visual perception. 
Taking situation-specificity and domain-specificity together would suggest a more 
complex pattern of inter- and intra-individual differences in information processing. Such a 
complex pattern may be explained by the presence or absence of an explicit representation 
of context, thus explicit understanding of how each situation ties together a particular, but 
flexible set of different domains. A consequence of this interpretation would be that 
domains do not reflect specialized capacity spheres, but arise from the implicit elements of 
any mental representation. This view is espoused in the fourth cell of Figure 1. In this view 
the cultural frameworks of Benet-Martinez et al. (2006) thus might extend across domains 
only when an explicit recognition of any specific situation ties together its underlying 
domains. For example, a Japanese tea ceremony ties together domains of etiquette and 
physics for the social aspects of the ceremony and the preparation of tea. At the same time, 
the domains of Demetriou et al. (2005) might extend across many situations when actors 
have an explicit understanding of the similarities and differences of these situations, but do 
not have to generalize so broadly when this understanding is not explicit. For example, 





people recognize how exactly the preparation of food is both similar and different than 
classroom math. Herein also lies the practical implication of my dissertation. It seems as if 
education is too much focused on any domain in isolation. Children should be taught 
precisely how situations are similar and different and how domains may relate to each 
other in everyday life. 
Cognitive transfer in everyday life is multifaceted. At the least, that is what research 
in my dissertation has shown. We follow Cole and Bruner (1971) by proposing that 
researchers need to invest their time by trying to determine how transfer may be improved. 
Transfer is strong in some situations, but absent in others (Barnett & Ceci, 2002; diSessa, 
1993; Wagner, 2006). Exploring the precise nature of many situations will help to sort out 
the knowns and unknowns of transfer.  
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Summary (in English) 
 
 
The present thesis captures four studies that chart the connection between culture and 
cognitive development, starting quite distal by looking at country differences in Raven 
Matrices scores but growing gradually more proximal by zooming in on the processes and 
causes that produce or moderate cognitive transfer in childhood. Michael Cole aptly 
captured the distribution of cognition in time and how it relates to the individual child, in 
his book Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline. His model includes six time 
scales that frame children’s experience: the history of the physical universe (geological 
time), the history of life on earth (phylogeny), the history of human beings on earth 
(cultural-historical time), the history of the individual’s immediate context (ontogeny of 
the outside), the life of the individual himself (ontogeny), and the history of moment-to-
moment lived experience (microgenesis). Through the parents or through schooling, the 
six transformations become materialized constraints on the child’s experiences in the 
present. Parents’ idealized recall of their past and idealized imagination of their child’s 
future leads them to encourage and promote their child in particular ways and not others. 
The four studies of this thesis address developmental transitions at the four lower 
times scales of this model of the distribution of cognition in time, ignoring the geological 
time and phylogeny. The first study addresses cultural-historical time in a meta-analysis of 
cultural and historical variation in Raven’s Progressive Matrices. The Flynn effect is 
among the hypotheses considered. The second study addresses ontogeny of the outside in a 
cross-sectional comparison of schooling and everyday experiences and their separate 
contribution to cognitive development among Kharwar children in rural India. The third 
study is a longitudinal extension of the second study and addresses ontogeny of the child 
more directly than the second study, by looking at variations in impact of the different 
processes of cognitive development. The fourth and last study addresses microgenesis in a 
study of within-subject switches in the processing of two kinds of typicality, ideals and 
features, amongst Dutch monocultural and bicultural children. Each of the four study will 




now be summarized separately. 
The first chapter addresses variation in Raven’s Progressive Matrices scores across 
time and place. Raven’s Progressive Matrices are a series of multiple-choice items of 
abstract reasoning. Each item depicts an abstract pattern in a two by two or three by three 
matrix; all cells contain a figure except for the cell in the right lower corner. Participants 
are asked to identify the missing segment that would best complement the pattern 
constituted by the other cells among a set of alternatives that are positioned beneath the 
matrix. John C. Raven published the first version of the test in 1938; the three versions of 
the test (Advanced, Colored, and Standard Progressive Matrices) have since then been 
among the most widely-used intelligence tests. Its intuitively appealing question format 
and the use of figure stimuli have made the test attractive for cross-cultural comparisons. A 
meta-analysis of cross-cultural intelligence test scores found that the test takes a second 
place after the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children. This widespread usage makes the 
test an interesting instrument for a cross-cultural meta-analysis. Moreover, the period in 
which the Raven has been used in various countries is long enough for enabling a study of 
a temporal patterning of test scores.  
Studies that report data on Raven’s Progressive Matrices were located with help of 
library search engines and a request for data was sent to more than 200 authors. Data were 
analyzed of 798 samples coming from 45 countries (? = 244,316), which were published 
between 1944 and 2003. Country-level indicators of educational permeation (which 
involves a broad set of interrelated educational input and output factors that are strongly 
related to economic development), the samples’ educational age, and publication year were 
all independently related to performance on Raven’s matrices. Our data suggest that 
country differences in Raven performance reflect a Flynn effect that is present in high as 
well as low GNP countries. The tangible size of the Flynn effect is moderated by 
education-related sample and country characteristics and seems to be rather smaller in 
developed than in emerging countries. 
The second chapter addresses an experiment of schooling and everyday cognitive 
development among Kharwar children in India. Schooling is a setting where teachers and 
pupils conspire to elevate pupils’ extent of transfer. This conspiracy is motivated by the 




perception that generalization offers an advantage in the processing of cognitive tasks that 
cannot be achieved with unique rules for each new task. Despite this perception, the 
processes that produce farther transfer in school are subject to discussion. On the one hand, 
there is the view that teachers labor to create new intellectual structures in children’s 
repertoire. On the other hand, there is the view schooling broadens children’s field of 
application of thinking, but that it does not really constitute new thought processes. A 
possible approach to unraveling individual differences in children’s intellectual structure 
and transfer is the comparison of the effects of educational age and chronological age. 
Unfortunately, such a comparison appears difficult to implement in practice. Western-
based studies may only employ highly correlated measures of chronological and 
educational age, which seriously limits their power to disentangle the products of these 
ages. Non-Western studies show another confounding, educational age tends to be related 
to socioeconomic status in these studies and thus create a sampling bias. 
In order to avoid these confounds we took advantage of a particular setting among 
the Kharwar society in India, in which neither educational age and chronological age, nor 
schooling and status, are confounded, allowing a study design that avoids the usual 
limitations of studying the effects of schooling. The sample comprised 201 schooled and 
unschooled Kharwar children from six to nine years of age. The test battery contained 
measures of mathematics and memory with formal and local stimulus content, as well as 
tests of inductive reasoning, analogies, fluency, picture vocabulary, and numbers. 
Confirmatory factor analyses supported similar hierarchical factor structures, with general 
intelligence in the apex, for unschooled and schooled children. The per annum score 
increments of chronological age were about twice as large as those of educational age. 
These findings illustrate the role of everyday experiences in the development of cognitive 
functioning and that schooling broadens children’s field of thinking. 
The third chapter addresses a longitudinal study among Kharwar children in India of 
everyday and school-specificity of representational change. Children towards the end of 
middle childhood treat new information in ways that are quite a bit different from that of 
very young children. For very young children new information is associated with the 
categorization of behavior, human-made items, and living kinds, but for children towards 




the end of middle childhood new information is associated with the transfer of properties 
and the consideration of similarity. A shift from categorization to transfer may be deduced 
from different lines of research, but so far evidence of this shift has been rather 
circumstantial. Previous research found that both everyday and school experiences 
contribute to children’s cognitive development and that both kinds of age predict the 
achievement on cognitive exercises. To understand the nature of age-related changes in 
development, researchers in developmental psychology have begun to examine the implicit 
and explicit character of representation. Through dynamic self-organizing interaction 
between these two types of representation their developmental trajectories change shape. 
Development is triggered by new input, which can lead to changes in either children’s 
implicit or explicit representation. This change in their representation has consequences for 
the way that future input could trigger development. 
In order to find empirical support for this claim we examined the shift in cognitive 
development more directly by examining variation within children’s modes of 
development across chronological age and educational age in India by means of a two-
wave longitudinal design with a three-year interval. A longitudinal design in this particular 
setting allows us to take a closer look at intra-individual processes of change and to 
demonstrate how chronological age and educational age precisely relate to this shift. The 
sample comprised of 191 children aged between six and twelve years. Five measures of 
implicit and explicit representation were administered. Confirmatory analyses revealed two 
processes of development: One that reflects children’s hierarchical construction of 
knowledge and another that reflects the actualization of knowledge across particulars. 
Analyses of the net development per year revealed a decrement of the effect of 
chronological age and an increase of the effect of educational age. 
The fourth chapter addresses the natural variation of typicality in childhood by 
examining visual search of ideals and features in a multicultural context. The most 
representative member of a category is not always the exact same one. One book would be 
considered a better example of things that can be read than a drug prescription or a TV 
guide by most children and adults, but for most other categories the most typical example 
could be different for people of different ages, different cultural backgrounds, or even for 




one person in different situations. The true nature of this variation has been examined 
extensively over the last decades, but studies often confound typicality and familiarity. 
Often, developmental studies and cross-cultural studies claim some strong form of 
specificity in preference for either features or ideals to define categories. Observing 
typicality and familiarity from a connectionist modeling perspective suggests that with 
each integration of new units into a representation, the average typicality of each unit 
declines. Thus with increasing familiarity of some concept the relevance of its features 
becomes smaller. Relevance seems to shift to the meaning that is shared by several units, 
the associations. In other words: with increasing familiarity, ideals become more typical. 
In order to find empirical support for this claim we collected decision times of a 
total of 59 Turkish-Dutch and 58 Dutch primary school children (mean age is 11.09 years). 
The children completed a 96-item series of visual search tasks, in which they had to see 
whether a target that was presented to them first, was present in a subsequent set of 
distractors. Familiarity was manipulated by using both Turkish and Dutch items and 
typicality was manipulated by varying the difference between the targets and their own 
respective distractors. Main effects of familiarity and typicality were not significant, but 
their interaction was. Examination of the estimated marginal means revealed that low 
familiarity led to an advantage in the processing of features, whereas high familiarity to an 
advantage in the processing of ideals. Familiarity is necessary for typicality. 
Taken together the four studies have critical implications for the conceptualization 
of culture and cognitive transfer in childhood. Differences are often taken as to reflect 
problems with the access or meaning of particular procedures, representations, and 
principles. Our findings question this approach to differences. Rather, differences are 
caused by the generation or prediction of new properties after the procedure, representation 
or principle has been correctly inferred from the premise. Schooling promotes the 
generation and prediction of properties in pupils and the promotion has much to do with 
enrichment of the pool properties children represent and have to draw from in making 
successful generalizations in their everyday life. 
 
Summary (in Dutch) 
 
 
Deze thesis bevat vier studies die de relatie tussen cultuur en cognitieve ontwikkeling in 
kaart brengt, vrij distaal beginnend door te kijken naar landsverschillen in scores op de 
Raven Matrices maar geleidelijk meer proximaal wordend door in te zoomen op de 
processen en oorzaken van de factoren die cognitieve ontwikkeling veroorzaken of sturen. 
Michael Cole ving de distributie van cognitie over tijd en hoe het verhoudt tot het kind 
goed in zijn boek Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline. Zijn model bevat 
zes schalen die de ervaringen van kinderen inkaderen: De geschiedenis van het fysieke 
universum (geologische tijd), de geschiedenis van leven op aarde (fylogenie), geschiedenis 
van de mens op aarde (cultuur-historische tijd), de geschiedenis van iemands directe 
omgeving (ontogenese van het uitwendige), het leven van het individu (ontogenese), en de 
geschiedenis van moment-tot-moment ervaring (microgenese). Door middel van de ouders 
of door middel van scholing, worden deze zes transformaties gematerialiseerde restricties 
op de ervaring van kinderen in het heden. Een geïdealiseerde herinnering van het verleden 
en een geïdealiseerde voorstelling van de toekomst van hun kind leidt ouders tot het 
aanmoediging van hun kinderen op bepaalde manieren en niet andere.  
De vier studies in deze thesis richt zich op de vier lagere schalen in dit model over 
de distributie van cognitie in tijd, dus geologische tijd en fylogenie buiten beschouwing 
latend. De eerste studie richt zich op de cultuur-historische tijd in een meta-analyse van 
culturele en historische variatie in Raven’s Progressieve Matrices. Het Flynn-effect is een 
van hypotheses die aan bod komt. De tweede studie richt zich op de ontogenese van het 
uitwendige in een cross-sectionele vergelijking van scholing en alledaagse ervaringen en 
hun afzonderlijke bijdrages aan de cognitieve ontwikkeling van Kharwar kinderen in ruraal 
India. De derde studie is een longitudinale uitbreiding van de tweede studie en richt zich 
meer direct op de ontogenese van het kind dan de tweede studie, door te kijken naar de 
impact van verschillende ontwikkelingsprocessen. De vierde en laatste studie richt zich op 
microgenese in een studie van intra-individuele verschillen in de verwerking van twee 




soorten kenmerkendheid, idealen en eigenaardigheden, bij Nederlandse biculturele en 
monoculturele kinderen. Elk van de vier studies zal nu beknopt worden besproken. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk richt zich op variatie in Raven’s Progressieve Matrices scores 
over tijd en plaats. Raven’s Progressieve Matrices is een serie van meerkeuze items van 
abstract redeneren. Elk item verbeeldt een abstract patroon in een twee bij twee of drie bij 
drie matrix; elke cel bevat een figuur de cel in de rechter benedenhoek. Participanten wordt 
gevraagd om in een set van alternatieven die beneden de matrix is geplaatst het missende 
segment te identificeren dat het beste het patroon van de andere cellen complementeert. 
John C. Raven publiceerde de eerste versie van de test in1938; sinds die tijd zijn de drie 
versies van de test (Geavanceerde, Standaard, en Gekleurde Progressieve Matrices) onder 
de meest gebruikte intelligentie testen. Het intuïtief aantrekkelijke vraag format en het 
gebruik van figuratieve stimuli hebben de test aantrekkelijk gemaakt voor crossculturele 
vergelijkingen. Een meta-analyse van crossculturele intelligentie test scores vond dat de 
test een tweede plaats in nam na de Wechsler Intelligentie Schalen voor Kinderen. Dit 
wijdverspreid gebruik maken de test een interessant instrument voor een crossculturele 
meta-analyse. Bovendien, de periode waarin de Raven is gebruikt in verschillende landen 
is lang genoeg om een studie van de temporele patronen in test scores mogelijke te maken.  
Studies die data over de Raven’s Progressieve Matrices rapporteren werden 
gelokaliseerd met hulp van bibliothecaire zoeksystemen en een verzoek voor data werd 
verzonden aan meer dan 200 auteurs. Data van 798 samples uit meer dan 45 landen (? = 
244316), gepubliceerd tussen 1944 en 2003, werden geanalyseerd. Landsniveau variabelen 
van de doordrongenheid van onderwijs (waar het gaat om een brede set van geassocieerde 
onderwijs input en output factoren die sterk samenhangen met economische ontwikkeling), 
de hoeveelheid onderwijs voor iedere sample, en publicatie jaar waren alle onafhankelijk 
gerelateerd aan performance op Raven’s matrices. De data suggereren dat landsverschillen 
in Raven performance een Flynn effect in zowel hoge als lage BNP landen reflecteert. De 
werkelijke grootte van het Flynn effect wordt gemodereerd door onderwijs gerelateerde 
sample en landskarakteristieken en lijkt kleiner in ontwikkelde landen dan in opkomende 
landen.  
Het tweede hoofdstuk richt zich op een experiment van scholing en alledaagse 




cognitieve ontwikkeling bij Kharwar kinderen in India. Scholing is een setting waarin 
leraren in leerlingen samenspannen om het vermogen tot transfer van de leerlingen te 
vergroten. Deze samenwerking wordt gemotiveerd door de observatie dat generalisatie een 
voordeel in het verwerken van cognitieve taken bied die niet kan worden bereikt door het 
leren van unieke regels voor elke nieuwe taak. Ondanks deze observatie zijn de processen 
die verre transfer mogelijk maken onderwerp van discussie. Aan de ene kant is er de visie 
dat leraren hun best doen om nieuwe intellectuele structuren in het repertoire van kinderen 
aan te brengen. Aan de andere kant is er de visie dat scholing het toepassingsgebied van 
het denken van kinderen verbreedt, maar dat dit niet bestaat uit nieuwe denkprocessen. Een 
manier om individuele verschillen in intellectuele structuur en transfer uit elkaar te trekken 
is een vergelijking van de effecten van het aantal jaren scholing en chronologische leeftijd. 
Jammer genoeg is een dergelijke vergelijking moeilijk te realiseren. Westerse studies 
kunnen hoge correlatie tussen aantal jaren scholing en leeftijd niet vermijden, wat het 
vermogen om de twee uit elkaar te trekken aanzienlijk beperkt. Niet-westerse studies 
vertonen een andere verwarring: aantal jaren scholing is in deze studies geneigd om samen 
te hangen met sociaaleconomische status en dus tot de creatie van sample bias. 
Om deze verwarring te vermijden hebben we gebruik gemaakt van een bijzondere 
setting in de Kharwar gemeenschap in India, waar zowel aantal jaren scholing en leeftijd 
als aantal jaren scholing en sociaaleconomische status niet met elkaar samenhangen, en 
dus een studie design mogelijk maakt die de gebruikelijke beperkingen van de studies van 
de effecten van scholing vermijd. De sample bestaat uit 201 geschoolde en ongeschoolde 
Kharwar kinderen in de leeftijd van zes tot negen jaar. De test batterij bestaat uit wiskunde 
en geheugen met zowel formele als alledaagse stimulus inhoud en testen van inductief 
redeneren, analogieën, ideebeheersing, vocabulaire, en getallen. Confirmatorische factor-
analyse onderbouwd gelijke hiërarchische factor structuren, met algemene intelligentie in 
de top, voor zowel geschoolde en ongeschoolde kinderen. De score toename per jaar was 
tweemaal was ongeveer twee maal zo groot voor leeftijd als voor scholing. De bevindingen 
illustreren de rol van alledaagse ervaringen in de ontwikkeling van cognitief functioneren 
en dat scholing de toepassing van denken verbreedt. 
Het derde hoofdstuk richt zich op een longitudinale studie van alledaagse en school 




specificiteit van de verandering in representatie bij Kharwar kinderen in India. Kinderen 
aan het eind van de middenkindertijd bejegenen nieuwe informatie op manieren die vrij 
anders zijn dan de manieren waarop jonge kinderen dat doen. Voor heel jonge kinderen is 
nieuwe informatie geassocieerd met de categorisatie van gedrag, door mensen gemaakte 
artefacten, en levende dingen, terwijl voor kinderen aan het eind van de middenkindertijd 
is nieuwe informatie geassocieerd met de transfer van eigenschappen en het in aanmerking 
nemen van overeenkomst. Een verschuiving van categorisatie naar transfer mag worden 
herleid uit verschillende lijnen van onderzoek, maar tot dusver is het bewijs voor deze 
verschuiving omstandig. Eerder onderzoek liet zien dat zowel alledaagse als schoolse 
ervaringen bijdragen aan de cognitieve ontwikkeling van kinderen en dat beide ervaringen 
het succes op cognitieve oefeningen voorspellen. Om de werkelijk achtergrond van de 
leeftijdsgerelateerde veranderingen te begrijpen zijn ontwikkelingspsychologen begonnen 
met het onderzoeken van de impliciete en expliciete eigenschappen van representatie. Door 
middel van dynamische zelfregulerende interactie tussen de twee types van ervaring wordt 
de hun richting gevormd. Ontwikkeling start met nieuwe input, wat vervolgens kan leiden 
tot verandering in oftewel de impliciete oftewel de expliciete representatie van kinderen. 
Deze verandering in representatie heeft een verandering in manier waarop toekomstige 
input wordt bejegend tot gevolg.  
Om empirische steun voor deze bewering te vinden, hebben wij de verschuiving in 
cognitieve ontwikkeling meer direct bestudeerd door te kijken naar variatie in de vorm van 
ontwikkeling over leeftijd en aantal jaren scholing in India met hulp van een longitudinaal 
onderzoek met twee metingen over een interval van drie jaar. Een longitudinaal design 
staat in deze setting een nauwkeurigere blik op intra-individuele processen van verandering 
toe en stelt ons in staat om de precieze relatie van leeftijd en scholing met de verschuiving 
aan te tonen. De sample bestaat uit 191 kinderen in een leeftijd van zes tot twaalf jaar. Vijf 
maten voor impliciete en expliciete representatie werden afgenomen. Confirmatorische 
factor-analyse onthulde twee processen van ontwikkeling: Een die de hiërarchische 
constructie van kennis omvat en een andere die de actualisatie van kennis over details 
bevat. Analyse van de netto ontwikkeling per jaar laat een afname in de ontwikkeling over 
leeftijd zien en een toename in de ontwikkeling over jaren scholing. 




Het vierde hoofdstuk richt zich op natuurlijk variatie in kenmerkendheid tijdens de 
kindertijd door visueel zoeken van idealen en eigenaardigheden te onderzoeken in een 
multiculturele context. Het meest representatieve lid van een categorie is niet altijd precies 
dezelfde. Een boek is een beter voorbeeld voor iets wat je kunt lezen dan een televisiegids 
of een doktersrecept voor de meeste kinderen en volwassen, maar voor veel categorieën zal 
het meest kenmerkende voorbeeld anders zijn voor mensen van verschillende leeftijden, 
met verschillende culturele achtergronden, of zelfs voor dezelfde persoon in verschillende 
situaties. De ware natuur van deze variatie is extensief bestudeerd in de laatste decennia, 
maar studies verwarren vaak kenmerkendheid en bekendheid. Vaak claimen crossculturele 
en ontwikkelingspsychologische studies een sterke vorm van specificiteit in preferentie 
voor enerzijds opvallende eigenaardigheden of anderzijds idealen om categorieën mee te 
definiëren. Observatie van kenmerkendheid en bekendheid vanuit een netwerk benadering 
suggereert dat met elke integratie van een nieuwe eenheden in de representatie, de 
gemiddelde kenmerkendheid van de elke eenheid daalt. Dus met toenemende bekendheid 
met een zeker concept neemt de relevantie van losse kenmerken af. Relevantie verschuift 
naar de betekenis die wordt gedeeld door meerdere eenheden, de associaties. Met andere 
woorden: Met toenemende bekendheid worden idealen meer kenmerkend.  
Om empirische steun voor deze bewering te vinden, hebben we reactietijd van in 
totaal 59 Turks-Nederlandse kinderen en 58 Nederlandse kinderen (met een gemiddelde 
leeftijd van 11.09 jaar) verzameld. De kinderen voltooiden een 96-item serie van visuele 
zoektaken, voor welke ze moesten zien of een afbeelding die eerst was gepresenteerd zich 
bevond tussen een daarop volgende set van afleidende afbeeldingen. Bekendheid werd 
gemanipuleerd door zowel Turkse als Nederlandse te gebruiken, terwijl kenmerkendheid 
werd gemanipuleerd door de verschillen tussen de target afbeeldingen en de desbetreffende 
afleidende afbeeldingen te variëren. Hoofdeffecten van bekendheid en kenmerkendheid 
waren niet significant, maar hun interactie wel. Analyse van de geschatte gemiddelden 
onthulde dat lage bekendheid tot een voordeel in het verwerken van eigenaardigheden 
leidde, terwijl hoge bekendheid leidde tot een voordeel in het verwerken van idealen. 
Bekendheid is noodzakelijk voor kenmerkendheid. 
Gezamenlijk hebben deze vier studies kritische implicaties voor de conceptualisatie 




van cultuur en cognitieve transfer in de kindertijd. Verschillen worden vaak geaccepteerd 
als gevolg van problemen met de toegankelijkheid of betekenis van specifieke procedures, 
representaties, of principes. Onze bevindingen trekken deze benadering in twijfel. Eerder 
lijken verschillen voort te komen uit het vrijmaken of voorspellen van nieuwe opvallende 
eigenaardigheden nadat de procedures, representaties, of principes al zijn geïnterfereerd 
van de premisse. Scholing bevordert het vrijmaken of voorspellen van nieuwe opvallende 
eigenaardigheden in leerlingen en deze bevordering heeft veel te doen met de verrijking 
van de poel van eigenaardigheden die kinderen representeren en waarop ze moeten terug 
vallen bij het maken van succesvolle generalisaties in het dagelijkse leven. 
 
 
